

## **2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi**

**Final Report  
February 2024**

**Evaluation team: Clément Charlot, Basileke Gift Kanike, Lutamyo Innocent  
Mwamlima**

**Evaluation supervisor: Abdou Karim DIEYE, Interim Senior Monitoring &  
Evaluation Officer of ARC**

## **Acknowledgement**

This report was written by Clément Charlot and Basileke Gift Mwamlima.

Special thanks go to Lutamyo Innocent Mwamlima, who managed the quantitative data collection in Malawi, to the data collection team, and to Hugo Chené who worked heavily on the quantitative data analysis.

The team would like to thank Abdou Karim Dieye, Doshanie Kadokera, Everisto Sikasunda, Fyawupi Mwafongo and Lusungu Kamudoni for their valuable comments on the various deliverables of this consultancy and their support throughout the mission.

The team would like to thank all the key informants from the *Department of Disaster Management Affairs, The Ministry of Agriculture*, Other members of the ARC Technical Working Group Malawian government representatives, beneficiaries and the Pan-African Risk Management Agency (ARC) who took part in individual interviews, quantitative surveys and focus groups.

## **Citation**

This report should be cited as follows: Charlot C., Mwamlima B (2024) Evaluation of the African Risk Capacity Payment Process for the 2021–22 agricultural season in Malawi.

## Table of contents

<b>Acknowledgement .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Table of contents .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>List of figures.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>List of tables .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>List of Acronyms.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Executive Summary .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>1. Introduction .....</b>	<b>10</b>
1.1 Country context: Food security situation .....	10
1.1.1 Food security .....	10
1.1.2 Disaster management in Malawi.....	11
1.1.3 Gender .....	13
1.2 ARC’s engagement timeline .....	13
1.3 ARC’s structure in-country .....	15
1.4 Process evaluation objectives and methodology .....	16
1.4.1 Objectives .....	16
1.4.2 Overview of the methodology .....	17
1.4.3 Limitations .....	18
<b>2. Final Implementation Plan: interventions and result .....</b>	<b>19</b>
2.1 Food security assessments and ARV bulletins.....	19
2.2 Beneficiary targeting system .....	21
2.3 Interventions and budget.....	23
2.4 Expected results.....	26
<b>3. Final implementation plan: actual delivery .....</b>	<b>28</b>
3.1 Actual targeting.....	28
3.2 Targeted beneficiaries by gender .....	31
3.3 Commodities/Cash distributed .....	32
3.4 Estimated budget versus insurance payout.....	33

3.5	Total expenditure to date .....	33
3.6	Monitoring and evaluation: System set in place by the Government to monitor the FIP .....	34
3.7	FIP’s actual delivery: key findings .....	35
<b>4.</b>	<b>Standard operating procedures: levels of compliance by the Government</b>	<b>42</b>
4.1	SOP assessment: audit matrix.....	42
4.2	Compliance with the SOPs: main findings .....	47
<b>5.</b>	<b>Efficiency and effectiveness of the Government interventions</b> .....	<b>48</b>
5.1	Cost to Transfer ratio for the implementation of interventions .....	48
5.2	Timely action of the Government interventions .....	50
5.3	Results achieved .....	51
5.4	Positive perceptions of outcome .....	53
<b>6.</b>	<b>Learning for future process audits</b> .....	<b>56</b>
<b>7.</b>	<b>Recommendations</b> .....	<b>58</b>
<b>8.</b>	<b>Annexes</b> .....	<b>61</b>
8.1	Terms of Reference .....	61
8.2	Evaluation Matrix.....	73
8.3	Detailed Methodology.....	79
	Inception phase & desk review .....	79
	Primary data collection .....	79
	Data analysis.....	81
8.4	Data Collection tools .....	82
	Beneficiaries.....	83
	Non-beneficiaries/Community Leaders/VDC.....	85
	Appendix 6: Data collection tool - Quantitative.....	86
8.5	Document reviewed. ....	101

## List of figures

Figure 1: ARC Programme Governance and Work streams.....	16
Figure 2: First sowing opportunity compared with the normal in Central and Southern Malawi & Projected end-of-season Water Requirements Satisfaction Index compared with benchmark for 100-day maize.....	20
Figure 3: Level of satisfaction with the quantity of assistance received (n=399).....	52
Figure 4: Average waiting time for beneficiaries on arrival at the distribution site (n=399) .....	53
Figure 5: Negative coping strategies used before the assistance (n=113).....	54

## List of tables

Table 1: Summary of ARC-GoM engagements from 2016 to 2017 following the first insurance policy .....	14
Table 2: Evaluation questions .....	17
Table 3: Methodological overview.....	18
Table 4: Targeting criteria from the JEFAP.....	22
Table 5 : Budget breakdown submitted in the FIP .....	24
Table 6: In-kind assistance targets .....	25
Table 7: Cash transfer targets.....	25
Table 8: Outcome and output indicators.....	26
Table 9: Summary actual ARC cash transfers.....	31
Table 10: Summary actual ARC maize distribution.....	32
Table 12: Comparison of FIP planned versus actual expenditures.....	33
Table 14: Updated payment monitoring and evaluation tables .....	37
Table 15: Cost to transfer ratio.....	48
Table 16: Food deficit months and distribution months for districts covered by ARC funding.....	50
Table 17: Delivery months versus planned distribution month for districts visited by the ET .....	51
Table 15: Districts visited.....	79
Table 16: Sample size .....	80

## List of Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Population
ACPC	Area Civil Protection Committee
ARC	African Risk Capacity
ARV	Africa Risk View
AU	African Union
CARD	Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development
CPC	Civil Protection Committee
CT	Cash Transfer
CTR	Cost to Transfer Ratio
DCCMS	Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services
DCPC	District Civil Protection Committee
DoDMA	Department of Disaster Management Affairs
DPR	Disaster Preparedness and Relief
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
ET	Evaluation Team
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FIP	Final Implementation Plan
GoM	Government of Malawi
GVH	Group Village Head
HDI	Human Development Index
HE	Horizontal Expansion
HH	Household
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMS	Information Management System
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
JEFAP	Joint Emergency Food Assistance Programme
KII	Key Informants Interview
LS-FIRP	Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan
LUANAR	Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MGCDWSW	Ministry of Gender, Community Development and Social Welfare
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MVAC	Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee
MWK	Malawi Kwacha
NCP	National Contingency Plan
NDRM	National Disaster Risk Management
NFRA	National Food Reserve Agency
OP	Operations Plan
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
PRIDE	Programme for Rural Irrigation Development

## 2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

SCTP	Social Cash Transfer Programme
SGR	Strategic Grain Reserve
SMEB	Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TA	Traditional Authorities
ToR	Terms of Reference
TWG	Technical Working Group
UBR	Unified Beneficiary Register
UNRC	United Nations Resident Coordinator
VCPC	Village Civil Protection Committee
VE	Vertical Expansion
WFP	World Food Programme

## Executive Summary

1. The African Risk Capacity (ARC) made a payout of USD14 249 461 to the Government of Malawi in parametric drought risk insurance pay to support the Malawian Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan. Following this payout, ARC commissioned a process evaluation of the 2021/2022 agricultural season payout.
2. The main objective of this evaluation was to assess whether the final implementation plan drawn by the Government of Malawi and validated by ARC, has been implemented according to the Final Implementation Plan (FIP), to evaluate the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation, and to generate lessons learned and recommendations. The evaluation took place from October 2023 to March 2024. The methodology for the evaluation relied on a mixed methods approach, consisting of a desk review, 21 key informant interviews, 23 focus group discussions, and a representative survey of 399 beneficiaries (157 men and 242 women).
3. The distribution followed a monthly ratio of 50 kg of maize or a monthly cash transfer value of MWK 25,000 per household as planned originally, for a duration ranging from one to three months in the districts planned in the FIP. The ARC cash assistance supported 103,085 households, thus achieving 97 percent of the FIP target, while the maize assistance supported 329,347 households, exceeding the targets of 67,207 by 390 percent and covering additional districts. Overall, with a cost to transfer ratio of 0.11\$<sup>1</sup>, the implementation demonstrated a high-cost efficiency.
4. The increase in the caseload in the maize distribution occurred as the expense of the duration of assistance. Initially planned for a duration of four to five months, which corresponds to the assessed food deficit, the maize assistance was reduced by two months in districts originally targeted. As for the cash assistance, it was reduced by one month. That month was supposed to be substituted with one month of maize assistance. However, it did not take place and led to tensions in communities.
5. The geographical targeting followed the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee assessment, which identified the affected districts and modelled a caseload of affected households (IPC 3 or above) per district. Then, the selection of households at village level relied on two targeting methods. The first method consisted in the vertical expansion of the Social Cash Transfer Programme providing a cash top-up to existing beneficiaries for the lean season. The second targeting method consisted in enrolling additional beneficiaries temporarily into the programme during the lean season in other targeted areas.
6. For the second targeting method,<sup>2</sup> there were mixed views among beneficiaries about the fitness for purpose of the targeting criteria and process. This was due to various

---

<sup>1</sup> It cost USD 0.11 to deliver USD 1 to beneficiaries.

<sup>2</sup> The evaluation collected limited information about the first targeting method and is not able to provide an evaluative judgement.



reasons: 1. The caseload attributed to each village was perceived to be misaligned with the severity of the drought, 2. The assessment of all vulnerable families in all villages was not done systematically, 3. There was a lack of accountability in the targeting process, with community meetings to validate beneficiary list not systematically taking place and no clear mechanism to address inclusion and exclusion errors.

7. The programme had planned to distribute assistance either in the month preceding the depletion of households' food reserves which means that that the distribution should have taken place between October 2022 and January 2023. The delivery was in general delayed by two to four weeks compared with the original schedule.
8. Regardless of the modality of assistance, beneficiaries were overall generally satisfied with the quality and the modality of assistance, and with the distribution process, though recommendations were made by recipients for the district to inform them earlier about the distribution dates. However, there was a low level of satisfaction regarding the quantity distributed, stemming from the short duration of the support and the amount of the transfer value/support, which represented 33% of the survival minimum expenditure basket.
9. With 94 percent of households reporting to having been affected by the drought, the assistance was recognised for its role in cushioning households during periods of food shortage. The primary impact was noted in households' ability to increase meal quantity or quality (82%). The secondary impact has been on school attendance, with households sending their children back to school (15%).<sup>3</sup> Though results stemming from the evaluation are positive, there should be considered with caution in the absence of a monitoring system put in place by the programme to provide additional information on the effectiveness of the assistance and to triangulate findings.
10. This evaluation has led to various recommendations which are captured below:
  - Revise the budget allocation for a future payout to increase the delivery costs;
  - Improve monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the payout;
  - Review the targeting methodology in order to reduce the exclusion and inclusion error rates;
  - Invest into accountability to affected populations;
  - Timeliness of the response with earlier delivery of assistance to affected households;
  - Internal learning – management response to track the implementation of recommendations from past and present process evaluations.

---

<sup>3</sup> Other positive impact included: "My household was able to buy livestock of inputs or work more in its farming activities" (6%) and "My household was able to buy livestock of inputs or work more in its farming activities" (5%).

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Country context: Food security situation

1. Malawi is a south-east African country bordered by Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Mozambique. It is narrow and landlocked but has a 750-kilometre-long border with Lake Malawi. It has highlands, central plateaux and isolated mountains. The East African Rift Valley runs through the country from north to south. Malawi covers an area of 118,500 km<sup>2</sup> and has a population of 19.1 million as of 2022.<sup>4</sup> Lilongwe is Malawi's capital city constituting 5.6 percent of the total population, slightly higher than the population share of Malawi's three other cities of Blantyre, Zomba and Mzuzu. The population is made up of about 49 percent aged 18 years or older, a further 4 percent aged 65 years or older, while the remaining proportion is aged below 18 years.<sup>5</sup> The economy is heavily dependent on agriculture, which employs over 80 percent of the population, and it is vulnerable to external shocks, particularly climatic shocks.<sup>6</sup>

#### 1.1.1 Food security

2. **Malawi is particularly prone to adverse climate hazards that include dry spells, seasonal droughts,** intense rainfall and floods. In the past decade, the country experienced climate change and variability that has led to various devastating shocks. The most notable shocks are erratic rainfall, drought, prolonged dry spells and strong winds. Malawi's climate condition is characterized by a subtropical climate with two main seasons, namely the cool dry season between May and October with mean temperatures of around 13°C in June and July, and the hot wet season between November and April with temperatures between 30°C and 35°C. Rainfall is variable depending on altitude and ranges from 600 mm for the Rift Valley floors to 1600 mm per annum for the mountainous areas. Local differences in rainfall are caused by complex topography causing deflections of moisture-bearing winds that are responsible for precipitation and rain-shadow effects in various terrains.<sup>7</sup> The low-lying areas such as Lower Shire Valley (southern region) and some localities in Salima (central region) and Karonga (northern region) are more vulnerable to floods than higher grounds.<sup>8</sup>
3. The 2021–2022 rainy season was characterized by late onset of planting rains, followed by sporadic and interspaced rains along dry spells resulting in the drying, scorching and permanent wilting of crops. **These shocks have affected various sectors of the economy, including agriculture.** Malawi's economy is largely

---

<sup>4</sup> The Common Wealth, 'Malawi (2022)', <https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/malawi#:~:text=Malawi%20is%20a%20%20south%2d%20East,central%20plateaus%20and%20isolated%20mountains>.

<sup>5</sup> Government of Malawi, National Statistical Office, '2018 Malawi Population and Housing', n.d.

<sup>6</sup> World Bank, 'The World Bank in Malawi', October 2023.

<sup>7</sup> World Bank, 'Malawi Vulnerability - Climate Change Knowledge Portal', 2021.

<sup>8</sup> Government of Malawi, Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services, 'Malawi Climate Change and Meteorological Data', 2024.

agriculture based, with the sector supporting about **80 percent of rural people's livelihoods**. About 16 percent of Malawi's maize production comes from irrigated farms.<sup>9</sup> The prolonged dry spell from October to January 2022 resulted in a large proportion of households in the central and northern regions being in dire need of food, as their food stocks depleted and as they faced severely limited financial access to food due to high prices. The Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) conducted a vulnerability assessment and analysis whose report indicated that about **3.82 million people were at risk of being food insecure (Integrated Food Security Phase (IPC) phase 3 and above) during the lean season and require food assistance for about two to six months, depending on the severity of the situation in the affected locations.**<sup>10</sup>

4. According to the Famine Early Warning System (FEWSNET), the period from October 2021 to January 2022 has been the driest period for the country since 1970, with the central region of Malawi experiencing one of the worst droughts on record.<sup>11</sup><sup>12</sup> While severe drought posed increasing risks of below average harvests, the southern and central parts of Malawi experienced heavy rainfall from Tropical Storm Ana towards the end of January 2022, leading to widespread flooding. This severely affected Nsanje, Chikwawa, Mulanje, Phalombe and Machinga in the southern region.<sup>13</sup>

### 1.1.2 Disaster management in Malawi

5. Recognizing the importance of mitigating the shocks caused by natural hazards, the Government of Malawi (GOM) has put in place a **legal and regulatory framework to strengthen the management of disasters**. The Government enacted the Disaster Preparedness and Relief (DPR) Act (1991), which established the Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA). In addition, the Government developed the National Disaster Risk Management (NDRM) Policy (2015) and developed a National Resilience Strategy in 2018 to guide disaster risk management in the country.
6. The GoM, through the DoDMA, is responsible for the overall coordination of the implementation of disaster risk reduction, mitigation, preparedness, and response and recovery activities, including the implementation of the emergency response of the Contingency plan. DoDMA, as the lead of the Inter-Cluster Coordination, is assisted by the relevant line Ministries with support from UN agencies, NGOs, the Malawi Red Cross Society and inter-agency coordination platforms. Within this set-up, there is a Humanitarian Country Team comprising Heads of UN agencies, international and local NGOs, the Government and the Malawi Red Cross Society. This team is co-chaired by the Secretary and Commissioner for Disaster Management Affairs and the United Nations Resident Coordinator. Specific sectors are organized through clusters such as

---

<sup>9</sup> MVAC, 'IPC Acute Food Security Analysis - June 2022-March 2023', August 2022.

<sup>10</sup> MVAC.MVAC.

<sup>11</sup> FEWSNET, 'Malawi Famine Early Warning Report', September 2022.

<sup>12</sup> OCHA, 'Anticipatory Action Framework - Malawi Dry Spells', 19 October 2021.

<sup>13</sup> FEWSNET Malawi, *FEWSNET 2022 Report*, 2022.

the Food Security, Nutrition, Protection, and Transport and Logistics for this response. At the local level, District Commissioners are mandated to coordinate any emergency-related activities in their districts through the Civil Protection Committees (CPC).

7. To protect vulnerable population groups and reduce the risks they faced during the 2021–2022 dry spells, **the Government of Malawi developed the 2021–2022 National Contingency Plan (NCP)**. The NCP establishes operational procedures for the response to specific hazards based on risks identified by DoDMA through the coordination cluster, based on seasonal weather forecast released by the Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services (DCCMS) and other emerging context-based criteria. The contingency planning process uses the inter-agency approach, which created an opportunity for the government and its partners to anticipate and plan for disasters through a participatory process. This is done with the aim of minimizing damage to property and loss of life, and for timely, gender-responsive and coordinated humanitarian assistance that responds to the different needs and priorities of people affected by a disaster.
8. **The 2021–2022 NCP was based on five prioritized anticipated hazards:** floods; dry spells; disease outbreak; pest infestation; strong winds/stormy rains. Based on a strong likelihood of occurrence, the 2021–2022 contingency planning assumptions envisioned the following:
  - Prolonged localized dry spells will result in between 50,000 to 250,000 households requiring food assistance over a 3-month period.
  - Flooding will occur due to heavy rainfall over a longer period, cumulatively affecting between 15,000 and 30,000 households (75,000 – 150,000 people), with up to 21,000 households requiring relief assistance for a period of up to 3 months and 10, 000 households displaced.
  - Moderate and localized strong winds will cause considerable damage to infrastructure, crops and trees, affecting between 5,000 and 12,000 households, requiring only temporary assistance.
9. Via the Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan (LS-FIRP), the **GoM aimed to provide support to the 3.82 million people at risk of food insecurity in 27 districts and 4 cities**,<sup>14</sup> thanks to the funding from UN agencies, the World Bank and the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Group.<sup>15</sup> Via a pool-funding system, the GOM provided support to the population groups at risk through cash transfers and food assistance. This was in recognition of the existing Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) implemented by the GOM. A scale- up of the SCTP was introduced through a vertical expansion (VE) approach to increase the cash allocation to existing SCTP beneficiaries and a horizontal expansion (HE) approach that temporarily enrolled additional

---

<sup>14</sup> MVAC, 'IPC Acute Food Security Analysis - June 2022-March 2023'.

<sup>15</sup> Government of Malawi, 'National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan', October 2022.

households during the lean season. **As Lead of the Food security cluster, DoDMA was responsible for the food security response of the LS-FIRP.**

### 1.1.3 Gender

10. Malawi lowly ranks at 169 out of 187 countries in the 2021 Human Development Index (HDI) and 132 out of 187 countries in the Gender Inequality Index. **Women contribute between 60 and 80 percent of the agricultural labour force in an economy largely agriculture based**, yet characterized by erratic climatic conditions.<sup>16</sup> As a result, **women are particularly affected by climate shocks**; poverty in Malawi is especially widespread among female-headed households, suggesting that investing in agricultural growth has benefits both for poverty reduction and for gender equality.<sup>17</sup>
11. The GOM has committed in its 2015 National Gender Policy to address gender parity and women's empowerment, and to uphold women's rights as a prerequisite for poverty reduction and sustainable development, through mainstreaming gender<sup>18</sup> in its medium and longer-term strategies.

## 1.2 ARC's engagement timeline

12. **The ARC was established as a specialized agency under the African Union (AU) in November 2012**, with the primary objective of enhancing the disaster preparedness and response capabilities of its member states in the face of extreme weather events and disasters, particularly in aiding food-insecure populations. Under the auspices and legal protections of the AU, the ARC Agency, operating through its Secretariat, offers member states various capacity-building services, including early warning systems, contingency planning and risk finance mechanisms. Presently, it boasts a membership of 32 AU countries and operates under the oversight of a Governing Board elected by member states and the African Union Commission.
13. **Malawi has been a member of the ARC since 2012**, when the Government of Malawi signed a memorandum of understanding that enabled it to be supported in enhancing its capacity to better plan, prepare for and respond to extreme weather events and disasters and to assist food-insecure populations. The GoM took out its first drought insurance policy for the 2015–2016 agriculture-growing season. Subsequently, Malawi received its first payout for the 2015–2016 season, when MVAC's assessment found that food-insecure people had increased from 6.5 million in May 2016 to 6.7 million in October 2016. The GoM submitted its revised Final Implementation Plan (FIP) to ARC in December 2016, which led to a payment of USD 8.1 million. The implementation of

---

<sup>16</sup> USAID, Malawi, 'HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND RESILIENCE', 2021.

<sup>17</sup> Talip Kilic et al, 'Gender & Agricultural Productivity in Malawi', 2013.

<sup>18</sup> Achieving equity in the accessibility, control, and utilization of social and economic opportunities and services across diverse demographics, including women, men, youth, older individuals, and vulnerable populations.

the FIP then took place from March to December 2017, after various model recalibrations,<sup>19</sup> as detailed in the summary table below.

**Table 1: Summary of ARC-GoM engagements from 2016 to 2017 following the first insurance policy<sup>20</sup>**

<b>Time Frame</b>	<b>Key Activity</b>
February 2016	ARC in-country team, with the Secretariat, launched an investigation to understand the cause of the discrepancy between model outputs and the situation on the ground.
May 2016	ARC engaged Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD), a research hub of the Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources (LUANAR) to assess the cause of the mismatch between predictions by the Africa Risk View (ARV) model and those by other actors on the ground.
May – September 2016	ARC Agency and National Technical Working Group (TWG) on the African Risk Capacity Programme reviewed MVAC assessment reports and CARD (LUANAR) survey report, and completed re-customization of the ARV model in September 2016.
October 2016	MVAC's assessment found that food-insecure people increased from 6.5 million in May 2016 to 6.7 million in October 2016; GoM contacted donor communities and NGOs, including ARC Limited for cash-based and food assistance.
15 November 2016	ARC Agency members mutually approved the revision of the Policy at the World Bank Annual Meetings and payout to GoM of USD 8.1 million.
December 2016	First submission of the revised Final Implementation Plan (FIP) to ARC.
Early January 2017	ARC Board approved the revised FIP for the insurance payment of USD 8,106,846 (commonly referred to as USD 8.1 million) to GoM.
18 January 2017	Actual payment of USD 8.1 million for the implementation of the FIP by GoM.
March 2017 to December 2017	Cash-based transfers distributed to beneficiaries through implementing partners and replenishment of Strategic Grain Reserves moved to December 2017 to ensure procurement of maize grain at recommended moisture content to avoid rotting.
June to August 2018	Process evaluation of the USD 8.1 million Payout

14. In 2015–16, disparities arose between the Africa Risk View estimate of drought-affected people and assessments by the Government and partners. Post-season validation with the Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) addressed these disparities and proposed refinements. These suggestions influenced the 2019-2020 customization review by the in-country Technical Working Group, comprising Government Ministries, Departments and partners. The Malawi-specific drought risk model from 2019 was used to monitor the 2019–2020 season. In 2020,

<sup>19</sup> African Center for Social Research and Economic Development, 'Process Evaluation of the 2016/ 2017 African Risk Capacity (ARC) Payout in Malawi', November 2018.

<sup>20</sup> African Center for Social Research and Economic Development, 'Process Evaluation of the 2016/ 2017 African Risk Capacity (ARC) Payout in Malawi', November 2018.

another review occurred, adjusting parameters based on in-country and the latest data. This customization formed the basis for Malawi's participation in the ARC 2020-2021 risk pool (Pool 7), supported by KfW/BMZ and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Programme for Rural Irrigation Development (PRIDE).

15. In 2021, the GOM customized its 2020–2021 drought risk model for the 2021–2022 agricultural season, notably by moving from a national aggregation of trigger parameters to subnational aggregating, dividing the country into four clusters. As part of ARC insurance Pool 8B (2021–2022), the GoM contracted insurance for the whole country, with a premium of USD 3,000,000 and a maximum payout of USD 14,249,461.


### **1.3 ARC's structure in-country**

16. In Malawi, **the ARC programme is managed by a Technical Working Group**, comprising expert members from various ministries as well as external stakeholders.<sup>21</sup> The TWG is coordinated by the ARC Country Engagement Manager and the Government Programme Coordinator, who is from the Ministry of Agriculture, MoA). The primary role of the TWG is to develop the country risk modelling, determine the risk parameters of the insurance and plan and implement the emergency assistance, should a payout be triggered.
17. **The TWG is broken down into four cross-cutting work streams**, which include different members based on their technical expertise. The figure below represents the organisation of the TWG and provides an overview of the role of each work stream.

---

<sup>21</sup> The organizations included in the TWG include the Ministry of Agriculture; the Ministry/Department of Disasters Management Affairs; the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development; the Ministry of Gender, Community Development and Social Welfare; the Ministry of Natural Resources and Climate Change; the World Food Programme and UNICEF.

Figure 1: ARC Programme Governance and Work streams<sup>22</sup>



18. The Operational Planning work stream, chaired by DoDMA, oversaw the design and implementation of the FIP. The FIP detailed how the payout provided by ARC was used to contribute to the food security response of the LS-FIRP. Notably, it provided information on the targeting strategy and criteria, the assistance (modality, duration, value) and the monitoring. It also provided information on the roles and responsibilities of the different actors involved in the implementation, notably the district councils, which played a significant role in the implementation of the LS-FIRP, and thus, the ARC payout.

**1.4 Process evaluation objectives and methodology**

**1.4.1 Objectives**

19. This evaluation has a **dual objective of accountability and learning**. It is intended to assess whether the FIP drawn up by the Government of Malawi and validated by the ARC, has been implemented in accordance with the design and process initially planned. Furthermore, this evaluation is designed to provide **an overview of the**

<sup>22</sup> ARC, 'APPENDIX 4 - Terms of Reference for the Technical Working Group (TWG) Members', n.d.



**effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation, achievement of results, the quality of its implementation and beneficiary satisfaction.** This evaluation is intended to generate **lessons learned and recommendations** to inform the design and implementation of future payouts in Malawi and in other countries supported by ARC.

20. This process evaluation will cover the following five areas, as set out in the terms of reference (available in annexe [8.1 Terms of Reference](#)):

- Assess the extent to which the FIP in Malawi is compliant with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of ARC;
- Review the interventions carried out with the support of the ARC payment in relation to the interventions initially described in the FIP;
- Evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of FIP's interventions, as well as beneficiaries' perceptions of the programme's performance and results;
- Evaluate the extent to which the interventions mainstream gender.

21. In the event of a drought, one of ARC's added value is that funds are released early – often before other funds become available<sup>23</sup> – which reduces the time needed to assist vulnerable populations, protect their livelihoods and prevent them from resorting to negative coping strategies such as selling agricultural assets or going without food. **Therefore, the evaluation should place particular emphasis on the progress and timeliness of activities and identify any deviations from the SOPs.**

22. The primary audience of this process evaluation is the ARC agency and the Government of Malawi, specifically the technical committee members and DoDMA. The secondary audience of the report are the other Member States.

**1.4.2 Overview of the methodology**

23. The evaluation questions addressed in this evaluation are summarized in the table below. The evaluation matrix, with these questions, their assessment criteria and data source, can be found in the [8.2 Evaluation Matrix](#).

**Table 2: Evaluation questions**

Assessment questions	Assessment criteria
Q 1: Coordination with other programmes during design and implementation	Coherence/Coordination
Q 2: Achievement of expected results	Effectiveness

<sup>23</sup> Risk Capacity, 'Contingency Planning Standards and Guidelines', n.d.

Q 3: Efficiency of the response	Efficiency
---------------------------------	------------

24. For the sake of conciseness, **the table below describes the main features of the process evaluation methodology.** The full methodology is presented in [8.3 Detailed Methodology](#). The evaluation team used **a mixed-method approach**, based on the collection and analysis of primary data (individual interviews, focus groups with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, and a quantitative survey of a representative sample of beneficiaries) and secondary data (programme documents, market studies, contextual documents and monitoring data).

**Table 3: Methodological overview**

<b>Inception report</b>	Inception report: Submitted on 3 November 2023, including an evaluation matrix, data collection methodology and tools. The final version was submitted on 25 November.	<b>Document review: 32 documents were consulted (internal notes, procedures, reports, information bulletins and diagnostics carried out).</b>
<b>Data collection</b>	<b>21 key informant interviews (KII)</b> with representatives of implementing agencies in Malawi, ARC, local authorities and other.	<b>23 FGDs</b> with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and members of Village Civil Protection Committees (VCPC)
	<b>399 beneficiaries</b> (157 men and 242 women) receiving cash or in-kind assistance randomly sampled in Chikwawa, Dedza, Dowa, Karonga, Mchinji, Mwanza, Nkhatabay and Nsanje districts.	
<b>Analysis and reporting</b>	Qualitative, primary and secondary data were recorded and coded to analyse emerging trends. This was done using an Excel coding matrix organized by evaluation question. Quantitative data were cleaned using R and Excel, and then analysed using descriptive statistics in Excel.	
<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>First draft:</b> 9 February 2024 <b>Final report:</b> 22 March 2024	

**1.4.3 Limitations**

25. **Timing of the evaluation:** It is strongly recommended that the process evaluation and beneficiary surveys be carried out immediately after the assistance is received. In the case of this evaluation, approximately one year will have elapsed between the receipt of the commodities and the start of the field survey, which may affect the ability of the stakeholders interviewed to recall details relating to the implementation of the FIP and LS-FIRP. In order to minimize this limitation, the evaluation team relied as much as possible on the document review in order to triangulate the information shared by the interviewees.

26. **Confusion among beneficiaries as to the assistance received:** This confusion arose due to households in certain districts receiving support from various organizations as part of the LS-FIRP and/or assistance linked to the Cyclone Freddy response, which coincided with the LS-FIRP. The issue was particularly noticeable in Chikwawa and Nsanje districts, where survey respondents often provided different details on the duration and month of delivery from what was documented in the FIP. Despite these discrepancies, the evaluation team opted to retain the data from these respondents, because verifications conducted with district authorities post data collection confirmed that these respondents had indeed received assistance funded by ARC.
27. **Access to documentation:** Accessing the documentation mentioned in the FIP and final report, as well as referred to in interviews, has proven to be challenging. Despite diligent follow-ups, the evaluation team (ET) faced difficulties in obtaining certain documents, such as market monitoring reports (which influenced the modality decision), monitoring visits and post-distribution monitoring reports. As a result, the ET was unable to triangulate certain findings with regard to the actual delivery of the FIP (see section [3. Final implementation plan: actual delivery](#)) or to answer some of the indicators relating to the compliance with the SOPs (see [Standard operating procedures \(SOPs\): levels of compliance by the Government](#)).
28. **Sampling:** The ET drew the sample from the FIP, which planned for the in-kind distribution to take place only in Chikwawa and Nsanje. As a result, the ET chose these two districts. However, the implementation of the in-kind distribution took place in an additional ten districts, which were not considered as part of the sampling strategy due to the ET not having access to the ARC final report when designing the sampling plan during the inception phase. Consequently, these two districts in the southern region were chosen while others in the central and southern regions were overlooked. This approach may introduce bias into the evaluation process.
29. **Gender mainstreaming:** Gender mainstreaming, a key element of the terms of reference, was not explicitly integrated into the design and implementation of the FIP or into ARC's standard procedures. Therefore, the consultants have adapted their assessment of the process to focus on gender mainstreaming in targeting and implementation, as presented in the evaluation matrix.

## 2. Final Implementation Plan: interventions and result

### 2.1 Food security assessments and ARV bulletins

30. In Malawi, the 2021–2022 agricultural season was characterized by drier conditions than usual at the beginning of the planting season in November and December, with most of the Northern and Central regions having received less than 60 percent<sup>24</sup> of the average cumulative rainfall compared with the 2001–2020 historical data.<sup>25</sup> As a

---


<sup>24</sup> African Risk Capacity, 'Africa RiskView MID-SEASON REPORT | Malawi (31 January 2022)', January 2022.

<sup>25</sup> African Risk Capacity, 'Africa RiskView Drought Model Customisation Report - Malawi', August 2021.


result, Africa Risk View anticipated an extensive sowing failure (see Figure 2 ),<sup>26</sup> especially in the Northern and Central regions, and estimated that about 6.4 million people would be affected by food insecurity during the lean season, thus triggering a payout whose amount would be calculated at the end of the agricultural season.

31. **The Africa Risk View (ARV) end of season bulletin confirmed the analysis of the mid-season bulletin, i.e.** 6.4 million people would be affected by food insecurity during the lean season, especially in the Northern and Central regions. Considering unit response cost of USD 42 per household, ARC’s 2021–2022 customization budgeted for a Modelled Drought Response Cost (MDRC) of about USD 268 million by the end of the season.<sup>27</sup> Consequently, as per the insurance premium taken out by the GoM, ARC triggered a payout of around USD 14.25 million to manage the effects of drought on vulnerable populations.<sup>28</sup>

**Figure 2: First sowing opportunity compared with the normal in Central and Southern Malawi & Projected end-of-season Water Requirements Satisfaction Index compared with benchmark for 100-day maize<sup>29</sup>**



**Figure 16: First sowing opportunity compared with the normal in Central and Southern Malawi, (November 11, 2021 –January 31, 2022). RFE2**



**Figure 19: Projected end-of-season WRSI compared to benchmark for 100-day maize (dekad 3, RFE2)**

<sup>26</sup> “This criterion for Malawi requires at least one event within the sowing window in which a minimum of 20 mm of rain is received in one dekad, followed by at least 5 mm of rain in the two subsequent dekads following the first where at least 20mm was received. If this sowing condition is not met, it is assumed that farmers would not have planted, or would have had unsuccessful planting.” Source: African Risk Capacity.

<sup>27</sup> This included USD121.9 million for the Central Cluster, USD114.4 million for the Southern Cluster, USD19.9 million for the Centre cluster and USD12 million for the Northern Cluster.

<sup>28</sup> African Risk Capacity, ‘Africa RiskView END-SEASON REPORT | Malawi (2021/22 SEASON), June 2022.

<sup>29</sup> African Risk Capacity.

## 2.2 Beneficiary targeting system

32. According to the FIP, the payout aimed to provide assistance to 173,091 households as follows: 1. **In-kind assistance:** 67,208 households supported with 50 kg of maize per month for a duration of four and five months, in Chikwawa and Nsanje respectively; 2. **Cash assistance:** 105,833 households supported with MWK 25,000 per month for a duration ranging from one to four months in 15 districts in the northern, central and southern regions. The targeting relied on a two-pronged approach, first with **geographical targeting and then vulnerability-based targeting.**
33. **The geographical targeting theoretically consisted in two subsequent steps.** First, the MVAC yearly assessment estimated the number of households in IPC 3+ per district and per Traditional Authorities (TA) that will be affected during the lean season.<sup>30</sup><sup>31</sup> Then, for each of the TA, the district authorities allocated a caseload proportionally to each Group Village Head (GVH),<sup>32</sup> based on their relative population size compared with the population size of the TA they belong to.<sup>33</sup>
34. Once a number of beneficiary households had been allocated to a GVH, **the vulnerability-based targeting first relied on the vertical expansion<sup>34</sup> of the SCTP,** i.e. households in each GVH who are already registered on the Unified Beneficiary Register (UBR) would receive a top-up, either in the form of cash or in-kind assistance, depending on the districts where they were based. The rationale for prioritizing VE was that these households were extremely poor and therefore more affected by the droughts than households that were not recipients of the SCTP.

---

<sup>30</sup> MVAC, 'IPC Acute Food Security Analysis - June 2022-March 2023'.

<sup>31</sup> Government of Malawi, '2022/2023 National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan', October 2022.

<sup>32</sup> Administrative limit comprising of group of villages.

<sup>33</sup> Joint Emergency Food Assistance Programme (JEFAP), 'Guidelines for the Provision of Food Assistance during Emergencies in Malawi - OPERATIONAL TOOLS', 2017.

<sup>34</sup> **Vertical expansion:** "A social protection programme can temporarily increase the benefit value or duration of a benefit provided through an existing programme, either for all or for some of the existing beneficiaries. This can be done via an adjustment of transfer amounts, or through the introduction of extraordinary payments or transfers, to a regular social assistance programme implemented in non-crisis times. The rationale may be to recognise the increased household costs as a result of the crises, or to temporarily harmonise the size of payments from the social assistance programme with a humanitarian response. Alternatively, if the payments are to be extended in duration, the rationale may be that there has been an extended period of need as a result of market disruption or agricultural production. With this approach, any extra support is provided as an integral part of the existing intervention – that is, it uses the same implementers and delivery channels". Source: European Commission. 2019. "Social Protection across the Humanitarian-Development Nexus: A Game Changer in Supporting People through Crises". *Tools and Methods Series*, No. 26.

35. For the remaining caseload available per GVH, **the vulnerability targeting relied on horizontal expansion**,<sup>35</sup> i.e. households that are not on regular social cash transfers would be targeted using the Joint Emergency Food Assistance Programme (JEFAP) vulnerability-based criteria detailed in the table below. In theory, the targeted households would meet three criteria out of five: 1. Owning less than two acres of land (category A1); 2. Without major livestock (e.g. cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, poultry) (category A1); 3. Without formal wage (category B4); 4. Perpetually depending on *Ganyu* (piece work) for daily food (category B4); without regular income-generating activities (IGA) (category B4); 5. Having less than three months of food stock starting from harvesting (category A1). Furthermore, in order to give preference to the poorest and labour-constrained, pre-identified beneficiaries would be prioritized in the following order: “1. Keeping a chronically ill patient(s); 2. Elderly-headed households; 3. Female-headed households; 4. Households taking care of orphans” (categories B1, B2 and B3).<sup>36</sup>

**Table 4: Targeting criteria from the JEFAP.**

Categories		Criteria	Why	Examples
<b>A</b>	1	Those with the smallest harvests	Likely to have lowest food stores	Number of months the food from Summer and Winter harvest has lasted / will last for a HH
	2	Those with the smallest land holdings or no access to land	Likely to have lowest food stores	Number of months the food from Summer and Winter harvest has lasted / will last for a HH
<b>B</b>	1	Those with malnourished children	Highly at risk of increased malnourishment	HH with malnourished children and/or malnourished children receiving supplementary or therapeutic feeding with a ration card SFP/OTP
	2	Those with the highest dependency ratio	Reduced ability to cope and food stores stretched	One able-bodied adult member (aged above 19 years) caring for 3+ other members

<sup>35</sup> **Horizontal expansion:** "Social assistance programmes can temporarily include new, crisis-affected beneficiaries in an existing social protection programme. This option may involve extending the programme to more people in the same geographical area or an extension of the programme’s geographical coverage to areas affected by the crises but not in the footprint of the ‘regular’ programme. The expansion of the regular programme into new territories can be achieved through either a pre-screening of potential beneficiaries before a crisis event and/ or through an extraordinary enrolment campaign to rapidly enrol those who fit programme criteria and who have been affected, or a modification/relaxation of eligibility criteria to allow more people to benefit. While the most effective and rapid scale-ups have agreed a number of parameters ex ante, these are not prerequisites. Ideally, the parameters to be agreed ex ante are where the scale-up should take place, which households are to receive support through the programme, and what the (objective) triggers to authorise a scale-up will be." Source: European Commission. 2019. "Social Protection across the Humanitarian-Development Nexus: A Game Changer in Supporting People through Crises". *Tools and Methods Series*, No. 26.

<sup>36</sup> Government of Malawi, ‘Operations Plan Malawi (ARC), June 2023.

	3	Those unable to work	Reduced ability to find income and cope	Child-headed HH: orphan-headed households or the parent or grandparent is incapable of undertaking the usual head of household roles Elderly-headed HH: (more than 60 years old) Households caring for orphaned children below 18 years old (where both parents have died) Households with chronically ill/HIV-AIDS, TB affected members Households with persons with disability or physically challenged
	4	Those with lowest levels or no external support	Reduced ability to cope	Households receiving on average less than MWK 10,000 of external support per month from all sources

36. After having been trained by District Civil Protection Committees (DCPC) and the Area Civil Protection Committees (ACPC), the Village Civil Protection Committees (VCPC) and traditional leaders visited households and completed “pre-lists of suggested households for humanitarian assistance”, which were validated in a community meeting in a “public declaration of accountability made by the VCPC and traditional leaders”.<sup>37</sup>

37. The Lean Response Food Insecurity Response planned for the **set-up of Complaints and Feedback Mechanisms** for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to file complaints about inclusion and exclusion errors, the distribution process as well as other projection issues. The mechanisms included oral complaint to the VPCPs or chiefs, complaint boxes and a national hotline.<sup>38</sup>

38. While the desk review is vague on the registration process for HE, according to three key informants, the registration of the HE caseload should have taken place on the Emergency Information Management System, which is maintained by the Ministry of Gender, Community Development and Social Welfare (MGCDWS). The MGCDWS would register the households on this parallel system to the UBR, and issue payrolls that would then trigger a payment from DoDMA to the districts.

**2.3 Interventions and budget**

39. On 31 May 2023,<sup>39</sup> the African Risk Capacity Insurance Company Limited (ARC Ltd) informed the GOM about an upcoming **parametric drought risk insurance payout**

<sup>37</sup> Government of Malawi, ‘2022/2023 National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan’.  
<sup>38</sup> Government of Malawi, ‘2022/2023 National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan’.  
<sup>39</sup> Dates estimated based on interviews.

amounting to **USD 14,249,450.46**<sup>40</sup>. The budget breakdown for the payout, as submitted in the FIP, is summarized in the table below. This funding was intended to contribute to the 2022–2023 Lean Season Food Security Response Plan, which amounted to USD 71,314,461.42. Hence, the ARC payout **represented 20 percent of the total funding, making it the second contributor after the World Bank.**<sup>41</sup>

**Table 5 : Budget breakdown submitted in the FIP**

Assessment questions	Proportion of ARC payout	Amount of estimated ARC payout (MWK)	Amount of estimated ARC payout (USD)
Maize distribution total budget	45.03%	6,673,509,475.00	8,938,037,914.00
Procurement/ replenishment of maize		5,042,677,500.00	4,848,728.34
Handling cost for maize		129,688,850.00	124,681.59
Transporter hiring cost		1,501,143,125.00	1,443,406.85
Cash transfers	53.76%	7,966,575,000.00	7,660,168.27
Financial support to District Councils	1.00%	147,655,317.78	141,976.27
Community sensitization and beneficiary registration		43,565,397.78	41,889.81
Distribution, supervision and monitoring by DoDMA and other central level stakeholders		104,089,920.00	100,086.46
Coordination and review meetings	0.21%	31,719,080.00	30,499.12
TOTAL	100%	14,819,458,872.78	14,249,460.46

40. In Nsanje and Chikwawa districts, where markets were considered not to be functioning,<sup>42</sup> **each targeted household would receive 50 kg of maize per month**

<sup>40</sup> March 2023, 'Report on the Implementation of the Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payout Funding under the 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme', March 2023.

<sup>41</sup> Government of Malawi, '2022/2023 National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan'.

<sup>42</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Malawi Approved FIP-ARC Drought Plan', September 2022.



**for a duration varying from four to five months**, depending on the estimated food gaps during the lean season.<sup>43</sup> The maize distributed was taken from the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) not to delay the implementation due to potential procurement delays. The distributions were supposed to take place in November and December 2022. The National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) would then replenish the SGR, using the ARC funding, using a mix of local, regional and international procurement.<sup>44</sup>

**Table 6: In-kind assistance targets**

#	District	Total Affected Households	ARC Target Maize distribution households	Duration	ARC Maize requirement (Mt)
1	Chikwawa	47,887	47,887	4	9,577
2	Nsanje	25,008	19,321	5	4,830
	<b>Total</b>	<b>72,895</b>	<b>67,208</b>		<b>14,408</b>

41. In the other 15 districts described in the table below, the modality of support was **unconditional cash transfers, with a transfer value of MWK 25,000 per month and for a duration varying from one to four months**, depending on the estimated food gaps.<sup>45</sup> The delivery mechanisms were mobile money and cash in envelopes for VE and HE beneficiaries respectively.

**Table 7: Cash transfer targets**

#	District	Total Affected Households	ARC Target Cash Beneficiary Households	Duration
1	Nkhata Bay	10,152	4,192	3
2	Ntcheu	32,708	6,362	3
3	Salima	23,821	15,421	3
4	Nsanje	25,008	5,687	1
5	Mwanza	8,221	6,362	4
20	Neno	8,182	6,176	4
6	Chitipa	5,596	2,166	3

<sup>43</sup> MVAC, 'IPC Acute Food Security Analysis - June 2022-March 2023'.

<sup>44</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Malawi Approved FIP-ARC Drought Plan'.

<sup>45</sup> MVAC, 'IPC Acute Food Security Analysis - June 2022-March 2023'.

7	Rumphu	8,127	4,475	3
8	Thyolo	34,260	4,838	3
9	Mchinji	21,949	12,478	3
10	Dedza	30,283	10,683	3
11	Dowa	19,056	857	3
12	Ntchisi	11,538	5,795	3
13	Kasungu	20,633	3,462	3
14	Nkhotakota-	19,038	11,165	3
15	Karonga-HE	13,237	5,714	3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>291,810</b>	<b>105,833</b>	

## 2.4 Expected results

42. While the FIP did not set clear targets, the ARC operations plan (OP) includes a set of output and outcome indicators, with set targets for the in-kind assistance and cash assistance, as summarized in the table below. The targets are mostly process oriented, with a maximum completion time of 180 days, limited inclusion and exclusion errors, and ensuring that 50 percent of assistance collectors are women. There was also one outcome target to improve the food consumption score of targeted households.

**Table 8: Outcome and output indicators**

Outcomes	Performance indicators	Means of verification
Outcome 1: Improve food consumption over the assistance period for targeted households	Percentage of household with borderline to acceptable food consumption score Baseline: 72% Target: 90%	Annual integrated household survey by the National Statistics Offices  Food and market assessment reports

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

<p>Output 1.1: Cash and in-kind assistance distributed in required amount to the targeted households within prescribed timeline</p>	<p>Number of women, men, girls and boys receiving cash transfers by category and a % of planned figure Target: 100%</p> <p>Proportion of electronic cash received and redeemed- Target: 100%</p> <p>% of cash transferred on time vs. planned - Target: 100%</p> <p>Tonnage of food distributed per month, by type and a % of planned - Target: 100%</p> <p>% of in-kind food distributions undertaken on time vs. planned - Target: 100%</p> <p>Proportion of female designated recipients for cash and food – Target 50%</p> <p>Number of security incidents - Target: 0.</p>	<p>Monthly and Final reports from DoDMA to ARC</p> <p>Final operational and financial report from DoDMA to ARC</p>
<p>Output 1.2: Targeting of beneficiaries is done efficiently as per targeting guidelines</p>	<p>Inclusion error – Target &lt;5%</p> <p>Exclusion error – Target &lt;10%</p> <p>% of community aware of the complaints procedures - Target: 85%</p> <p>% of community aware of targeting criteria - Target: 85%</p> <p>% of beneficiaries having to travel more than 1 hour to distribution - Target: less than 25%</p>	<p>Monthly and Final reports from DoDMA to ARC</p>
<p>Outcome 2: Improve implementation time of assistance for targeted households</p>	<p>First contact with targeted beneficiaries within 120 days of the ARC payout being received</p> <p>Activity completed within 180 days</p>	<p>Final report from DoDMA to ARC</p>

Output 2.1 Timely provision of the assistance to affected households	Actual time taken to roll out the response from ARC payout data against planned  Actual time taken to provide to targeted households against planned time  Actual time taken to complete activity against planned	Final report from DoDMA to ARC
--	---	--------------------------------

### 3. Final implementation plan: actual delivery

#### 3.1 Actual targeting

43. **The geographical targeting followed the same process as planned by DoDMA in the OP.** It was guided by the MVAC assessment, which identified the affected districts and modelled a caseload of affected households (IPC 3 or above) per district.<sup>46</sup>

44. In theory, most district councils, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, allocated a caseload per GVH/village based on the population size of the GVH vis-à-vis the district caseload, as per the JEFAP. However, in practice, some districts, such as Nkhatabay and Nsanje, evenly distributed the target number of households across GVHs and villages without considering the severity and impact of drought in the decision-making process. **This approach restricted the number of beneficiaries in some highly affected villages and appeared to be insensitive to the varying levels of drought severity in different villages.** Consequently, communities felt that this approach led to errors in inclusion and exclusion at the village level.

45. The selection of households at the GVH and village level relied on **two targeting methods. The first method consisted in the VE of the SCTP, providing a cash top-up to existing beneficiaries of SCTP for the lean season.** The top-up was equivalent to a monthly emergency food ration. The MGCDSW used the UBR, a social registry that consolidates household information for the SCTP.<sup>47</sup> Beneficiaries received an additional payment on top of their regular transfers.

46. The second targeting method consisted in enrolling additional beneficiaries **(HE)** temporarily into the programme during the lean season in other targeted areas. The evaluation found<sup>48</sup> that districts strived to follow the JEFAP, which are generic guidelines with a step-by-step targeting methodology, to target beneficiaries.<sup>49</sup> The

<sup>46</sup> MVAC, 'IPC Acute Food Security Analysis - June 2022-March 2023'.

<sup>47</sup> This allowed for the harmonization of targeting processes for social support programmes in Malawi funded by the World Bank and GIZ.

<sup>48</sup> Survey results indicate that 85% households mentioned they were selected either based on a predefined criteria or were selected by the local authorities tasked to do so.

<sup>49</sup> Government of Malawi, '2022/2023 National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan'.

VCPCs and TAs visited households and pre-listed beneficiaries at the village level, based on a set of targeting criteria. The targeted households were then endorsed openly by the whole village in a community meeting, which district council representatives were expected to attend.

47. **While the JEFAP was followed in all districts, its implementation varied significantly across districts.** In certain districts, there was a tendency to heavily rely on category B of the targeting criteria, particularly criterion B3, which meant that the programme overlooked the impact of drought on agricultural yields (criterion A1). Through community discussions, it became evident that this tended to prioritize socioeconomically vulnerable households rather than those most severely affected by the drought, which was perceived as a flaw by community members. Implementers explained that this approach was adopted to streamline the targeting process for communities. In certain villages, the majority of households were affected by the drought, making it challenging to differentiate them on the basis of criteria such as the impact on agricultural yield. Therefore, criteria such as "Households caring for orphaned children less than 18 years old (where both parents have died)" were chosen because they were easier to verify and justify, though this meant giving more prominence to the pre-existing socioeconomic vulnerability of households, as opposed to having been affected by the drought as per the programme's objective.
48. **Secondly, the extent to which all families were assessed in a village varied across locations.** In some villages, all households were visited by the VCPC and chiefs (of GHV and villages) to verify their status and vulnerability. In other villages, however, e.g. in Mchinji and Dowa districts, it was the VCPC and chiefs who ended up choosing the households they considered to meet the targeting criteria, without organizing any household visits or by visiting only some of them. In those villages, the fairness of the targeting process was comparatively more contested by non-beneficiaries as well as by some beneficiaries.
49. **Finally, the community validation meetings did not take place in all villages,** and when it did, the participation of the district authorities was not systematic. As explained in section [5.1 Cost to transfer ratio of the implementation of the interventions](#), district representatives lacked the budget and time to effectively monitor the process and participate in the validation meetings.
50. **This explained why there were mixed views among beneficiaries about the fitness for purpose of the targeting criteria and process.** Overall, 17 percent of beneficiaries (n=399) reported inclusion errors<sup>50</sup> and 62 percent reported exclusion errors,<sup>51</sup> with important variations across districts.<sup>52</sup> Beneficiaries unsurprisingly considered that their inclusion in the programme was relevant, though most

---

<sup>50</sup> Respondents replied either "Yes, many" or "Yes, few" to the question "Do you know people who didn't need the assistance who were included in the assistance/service provided?".

<sup>51</sup> Respondents replied either "Yes, many" or "Yes, few" to the question "Do you know people who need assistance who have been excluded from the assistance/service provided?".

<sup>52</sup> For example, 29% of respondents in Mwanza reported inclusion errors.

acknowledged that other vulnerable families were equally (or more) vulnerable and not registered in the programme due to the caseload being insufficient at their village level. Non-beneficiaries pointed out perceived biases in the programme's targeting criteria but also acknowledged that the caseload allocated to their villages was insufficient to cover all families in need. While the programme aimed to select deserving beneficiaries, there were reported instances where households who did not meet the criteria were listed and received assistance.

51. **While these differences in the point of view between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are common in any targeting exercise, they were further exacerbated by the lack of accountability in the targeting process.** The community validation meetings for the registration lists either did not take place or were not effectively used by the VCPC to take into account complaints about inclusion/exclusion errors. As reported in various interviews, although complaints were theoretically possible during the village meetings via the CPCs and complaint boxes, they would not change the outcome of the targeting process. In practice, according to the communities, feedback and complaints channels were not available during the selection and targeting process in most communities. Findings from communities in Nkhatabay, Karonga and Dedza demonstrated that you had to take the initiative to lodge a complaint at the district council or through the chiefs themselves, which was almost impossible, because the district authorities were not accessible and because chiefs were often leading on the targeting themselves. Communities were not aware of the toll-free number provided by the MGCDWS.<sup>53</sup> At best, complaint boxes were only available during the community or validation meetings and during distributions.
52. **There was no clear mechanism to address inclusion and exclusion errors, and thus to improve the efficiency of the targeting. At the selection stage with the limited timeframe, district councils and stakeholders had to list, verify and validate beneficiaries for assistance within the lean season period.** In FGDs with VCPCs, most participants acknowledged that the community meetings were more about sharing information about the list than about adjusting it based on community feedback, because this community mechanism “did not exist”.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, 45% of respondents (n=399) flagged an absence of taking into consideration suggestions or complaints.<sup>55</sup> Of these, 40% (n=180) reported that “No one wants to hear my complaint/ No mechanism available” and 33% that “Response times are too long”.
53. In comparison, the usage of the Unified Beneficiary Registry, which was piloted for HE by UNICEF in Nkharabay, was considered an effective way of targeting beneficiaries using existing information by key central level stakeholders from government and partner organizations. Three quarters of implementers believed it

---

<sup>53</sup> Government of Malawi, ‘2022/2023 National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan’.

<sup>54</sup> Mentioned in more than FGDs with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries

<sup>55</sup> Out of 399 respondents, 180 replied negatively to the question “To your knowledge, have suggestions or complaints raised by you, your household, or other members of your community been taken into account or followed up?”

had the potential to lead to a more robust and accountable targeting system. However, the database, which requires a full registry for each district, was updated irregularly and was incomplete across districts, thus making the system unavailable to DoDMA during the implementation.

### 3.2 Targeted beneficiaries by gender

54. **The ARC cash assistance supported 103,085 households, achieving 97 percent of the FIP target of 105,833, out of 266,801 affected households** in the ARC targeted districts. Consequently, the ARC programme reached 39 percent of the affected population.

**Table 9: Summary actual ARC cash transfers<sup>56</sup>**

#	District	Total affected households	Total assisted households	Duration (months)	Monthly value (MWK)
1	NkhataBay	10,152	3,791	2	25,000.00
2	Ntcheu-HE	32,708	5,812	2	25,000.00
3	Salima-HE	23,821	15,423	2	25,000.00
4	Mwanza-HE	8,221	6,363	3	25,000.00
5	Neno -HE	8,182	6,176	3	25,000.00
6	Chitipa-HE	5,596	2,171	2	25,000.00
7	Rumphu-HE	8,127	4,538	2	25,000.00
8	Thyolo-HE	34,260	4,838	3	25,000.00
9	Mchinji -HE	21,949	12,483	2	25,000.00
10	Dedza-HE	30,283	13,383	2	25,000.00
11	Dowa-HE	19,056	1,732	2	25,000.00
12	Ntchisi-HE	11,538	5,808	2	25,000.00
13	Kasungu-HE	20,633	3,610	2	25,000.00
14	Nkhotakota-HE	19,038	11,243	2	25,000.00
15	Karonga-HE	13,237	5,714	2	25,000.00
	<b>Total</b>	<b>266,801</b>	<b>103,085</b>		

55. **The ARC maize assistance supported 329,347 households**, surpassing by X% the FIP target of 67,208 and covering 444,856 affected households in the ARC targeted

<sup>56</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Report On The Implementation Of The Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payout Funding Under The 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme', March 2023.

districts. The ARC programme exceeded its target by 390 percent, reaching 74 percent of the affected population

**Table 10: Summary actual ARC maize distribution<sup>57</sup>**

#	District	Total Affected Households	Total Assisted Households	Duration (months)	Maize requirement (MT)
1	Chikwawa	47,887	47,887	2	4,789
2	Nsanje- HE	25,008	19,321	2	1,932
3	Nsanje-VE	25,008	5,687	1	284
4	Mwanza-HE	8,221	6,362	1	318
5	Neno -HE	8,182	6,176	1	309
6	Chiradzulu-HE	17,047	10,512	2	1,051
7	Thyolo	34,260	34,260	1	1,713
8	Blantyre-HE	34,260	34,260	1	1,713
9	Mulanje-HE	48,871	48,871	1	2,444
10	Zomba Rural	36,192	32,935	2	3,294
11	Lilongwe	79,636	45,840	1	2,292
12	Mangochi	58,019	29,000	1	1,450
13	Mzimba	22,265	8,236	1	412
	<b>Total</b>	<b>444,856</b>	<b>329,347</b>		<b>22,001</b>

56. Data on beneficiary households are not disaggregated by sex by the DoDMA. The evaluation team was therefore unable to determine what proportion of women and men-headed households received assistance.

### 3.3 Commodities/Cash distributed

57. The evaluation confirms that ARC assistance was provided to targeted beneficiaries through both in-kind support (maize distribution) and cash transfers. The distribution followed a **monthly ratio of 50 kg of maize** or a **monthly cash transfer value of MWK 25,000 per household** as planned originally.<sup>58</sup>

58. Due to the scarcity of maize on markets in targeted districts and delays by some partners to start the implementation of cash transfers as part of LS-FIRP, the programme included additional beneficiaries under the ARC maize distribution (see section [3.2 Targeted beneficiaries by gender](#)) in Chikwawa and Nsanje, as well as in districts that were not originally considered for maize distribution.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>57</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Report On The Implementation Of The Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payout Funding Under The 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme', March 2023.

<sup>58</sup> Household survey results with randomly interviewed household beneficiaries confirm at 100% to have received the DoDMA/ARC assistance in the 2022/23 lean season.

<sup>59</sup> Mwanza, Neno, Chiradzulu, Thyolo, Blantyre, Mulanje, Zomba, Lilongwe, Mangochi, Mzimba.



59. **The increase in the caseload occurred as the expense of the duration of assistance.** Initially planned for a duration of four to five months, which corresponds to the assessed food deficit,<sup>60</sup> the maize assistance was reduced to two months in Chikwawa and Nsanje.<sup>61</sup> Similarly, planned for a food deficit of three to four months, the cash assistance was reduced to between two and three months in all districts.
60. **In districts where the duration of cash assistance was reduced by one month, both DoDMA and the districts strategized to substitute it with one month of maize assistance.** They communicated this plan to the communities. However, as of the data collection in November 2023, **the distribution had not occurred.**<sup>62</sup> This delay led to frustration and tension within the community. Frustration stemmed from unfulfilled public commitments made by district authorities. Tension arose due to suspicions of fraud, with some community members wrongly believing that the VCPCs and chiefs had misappropriated the assistance. This situation underscored the need for transparent communication and timely execution to maintain community trust and prevent misinformation, which had not taken place.

### 3.4 Estimated budget versus insurance payout

61. According to the Final Implementation Plan report, the estimated budget amounted to MWK 14,819,438,872.78 (USD 14,249,460.45).<sup>63</sup> The insurance payout amounted to MWK 14,699,997,140.97, thus representing **99.2 percent of the expected payout.**<sup>64</sup>
62. **As planned, this payout had been integrated into the Food security response of the LS-FIRP.** The food security requirements amounted to USD 71,314,617.42, to which ARC contributed 20 percent, making it the second-biggest contributor.

### 3.5 Total expenditure to date

63. The financial data collected by the evaluation team are presented in the table below. Overall, **the percentage of the budget dedicated to maize distribution and cash delivery remained consistent (98.79 percent planned vs. 98.82 percent actual of the overall budget).**

**Table 11: Comparison of FIP planned versus actual expenditures<sup>65</sup>**

Planned	Actual
---------	--------

<sup>60</sup> MVAC, 'IPC Acute Food Security Analysis - June 2022-March 2023'.

<sup>61</sup> The data collected by the ET are inconclusive as to whether households received the remaining assistance from other actors in the areas. While 56% of respondents in Chikwawa (n=34) reported that they received two months of assistance, which corresponds to ARC funding, 12% and 34% reported they received 3 and 4 months of assistance respectively.

<sup>62</sup> As indicated by the household survey, FGDs and interviews.

<sup>63</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Malawi Approved FIP-ARC Drought Plan'.

<sup>64</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Report On The Implementation Of The Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payout Funding Under The 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme'.

<sup>65</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Report On The Implementation Of The Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payout Funding Under The 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme'.

<b>Maize distribution Total Budget</b>	<b>6,673,509,475</b>	<b>45.03%</b>	<b>8,938,037,914</b>	<b>60.80%</b>
Procurement/replenishment of maize	5,042,677,500	34.03%	7,700,000,000	51.96%
Handling cost for maize	129,688,850	0.88%	137,600,346	0.93%
Transporter hiring cost	1,501,143,125	10.13%	1,100,437,568	7.43%
<b>Cash Transfers</b>	<b>7,966,575,000</b>	<b>53.76%</b>	<b>5,588,675,000</b>	<b>38.02%</b>
<b>Financial support to district Councils</b>	<b>147,655,318</b>	<b>1.00%</b>	<b>173,284,227</b>	<b>1.18%</b>
Community sensitization and beneficiary registration	43,565,398	0.29%	107,681,660	0.73%
Distribution, supervision and monitoring by DoDMA and other central level stakeholders	104,089,920	0.70%	65,602,567	0.44%
<b>Coordinator and review meetings</b>	<b>31,719,080</b>	<b>0.21%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>14,819,458,873</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>14,699,997,141</b>	<b>100%</b>

64. The main difference in spending laid with the amount spent on maize, 51.96 percent actual versus 34.03 percent planned. That was the result of the increase in the maize coverage distribution explained in section [3.3 Commodities/Cash distributed](#). This led to a reduction in the duration of the cash assistance for cash recipients, which explains the 38.02 percent spent on cash transfers versus the 53.76 percent planned.

### **3.6 Monitoring and evaluation: System set in place by the Government to monitor the FIP**

**65. DoDMA, with other central level stakeholders, aimed to undertake a process and outcome monitoring of the cash and maize distributed as part of the LS-FIRP.**<sup>6667</sup>

Process monitoring involved assessing whether the food and cash were distributed to the intended beneficiaries on time and in the correct quantity and quality, as well as tracking the quality and efficiency of the distribution process through on-site monitoring and follow-up visits.

**66. The process monitoring did take place, involving irregular visits from district authorities in GVHs** for community meetings (these meetings were intended to validate the lists of recipients from the community-based targeting) and to organize and monitor the distribution of maize and cash.<sup>68</sup> Additionally, district authorities

<sup>66</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Malawi Approved FIP-ARC Drought Plan'.

<sup>67</sup> Government of Malawi, '2022/2023 National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan'.

<sup>68</sup> Although the ET did not have access to visit reports, it was able to determine that visits took place in the districts visited, by triangulating the data from interviews with district officers and FGDs with VCPCs, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

compiled and maintained lists of beneficiaries along with proof of receipt by the beneficiaries.<sup>69</sup>


67. However, it is crucial to note that these visits did not occur in all villages, as reported by both district authorities and VPCPs. Although the evaluation team was unable to precisely determine the percentage of GVHs and villages effectively monitored, interviews with two district representatives suggest **that monitoring took place in less than half of GVHs. Several limiting factors contributed to this.** Firstly, **the budget available** for monitoring the distribution was reportedly limited, restricting district representatives to only visit specific villages. Secondly, there seemed to be a **lack of guidelines and tools** from DoDMA on how many village districts were supposed to be monitored and how to sample them.<sup>70</sup>

68. Post-distribution monitoring (PDM) involved assessing the access and use of in-kind and cash assistance, and levels of satisfaction with the quantity and quality of the assistance. It is not clear whether the PDM was supposed to be specific to ARC or to be a joint exercise conducted as part of the LS-FIRP. Although the final report states that a “Post-distribution monitoring was being conducted [...] at the household level”, **there was no evidence<sup>71</sup> that a formal PDM took place to monitor the outcomes of the programme.** Had a PDM taken place, it would have proven challenging for DoDMA to report on the outcome indicators of the OP or the LS-FIRP, because most outcome indicators were percentages of improvement, e.g. Percentage of targeted households (male, female and child-headed) with borderline to acceptable food consumption scores, thus requiring a baseline as well.<sup>72</sup>

### 3.7 FIP’s actual delivery: key findings

69. To report on the results of the programme, the evaluation team relied on the monitoring and evaluation plan in the OP.<sup>73</sup> Due to the unavailability of secondary monitoring data, the table below was only populated with primary data collected during the process evaluation. Consequently, the ET was unable to measure the levels of achievement of all the process and outcome indicators.

**Table 13: Colour coding and rating system used**

Colour	Meaning
	<b>Green</b> — The target is met or close to being met (less than 5% variation)

<sup>69</sup> Based on the direct observation in two districts and the review of the beneficiary database in nine districts.

<sup>70</sup> For instance, should the district focus on the GVH with the largest caseload, ensure a mix of urban and rural GVH, etc.

<sup>71</sup> Interviews with implementers and local authorities, triangulated by the data from FGDs and the survey, suggested that no data collection took place following the distribution. Moreover, despite various requests, the ET did not have access to a PDM report or database.

<sup>72</sup> Government of Malawi, ‘2022/2023 National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan’.

<sup>73</sup> Government of Malawi, ‘Operations Plan Malawi (ARC)’.




	<b>Yellow</b> — The goal is not reached, but the difference between the target and the actual results is less than 25% or can be explained by a change in the programme's design. Another possibility is having data to measure the indicator, but it may not be at the right level of detail.
	<b>Red</b> — The target is not met and the variation between the target and the actual results is more than 25% and cannot be explained by a change in the programme's design.
	<b>Grey - not evaluated</b> — There are insufficient data to assess and report on the indicators.

Table 124: Updated payment monitoring and evaluation tables

Results	Indicators	Level of achievement of the indicator	Means of control/verification
Outcome 1: Improve food consumption over the assistance period for targeted households	Percentage of households with borderline to acceptable food consumption scores Baseline: 72% Target: 90%	No data	DoDMA and the districts did not conduct any baseline and endline survey before/after the distribution, or any PDM after the distribution. As a result, there are no data to calculate the food consumption scores of households before and after the distributions.
Output 1.1: Cash and in-kind assistance distributed in required amount to the targeted households within prescribed timeline	Number of women, men, girls and boys receiving cash transfers by category and a % of planned figure Target: 100%	98%. 103,815 households reached vs. 105,833 households planned, due to an increase in the number of households receiving maize support.  There are no target numbers of women, men, girls and boys receiving cash transfers.	ARC final report <sup>74</sup>
	Proportion of electronic cash received and redeemed - Target: 100%	No data	Data on the receipt and redemption of cash transfers lie with the Ministry of Gender, which oversees the SCTP. The ET made a formal request for these data in December 2023, which was unsuccessful.

<sup>74</sup> March 2023, 'Report on the Implementation of the Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payout Funding under the 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme'.

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

	% of cash transferred on time vs. planned - Target: 100%	No data	There are no set targets that are documented per district, making it impossible to measure this indicator.
	Proportion of female designated recipients for cash and food – Target 50%	53%. In the absence of a central recipient database, it was not feasible to calculate the proportion of female designated recipients for the entire programme. However, when the gender data were available for recipients of the districts visited, the ET found that women represented 53% <sup>75</sup> of household designated recipients.	ARC recipients database provided by Chikwawa, Dedza, Dowa, Karonga, Mchinji, Mwanza, Nkhatabay and Nsanje districts.
	Tonnage of food distributed per month, by type and a % of planned amount - Target: 100%	152%. 22 metric tons distributed versus 14.4 planned	ARC final report.
	Number of security incidents - Target: 0.	No security incidents were reported during the primary data collection by beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and district authorities.	ARC final report. Survey and FGDs with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and VCPCs. KII with district representatives.
Output 1.2: Targeting of beneficiaries is done efficiently as per targeting guidelines	Inclusion error – Target <5%	No formal monitoring data available to report on these indicators. Alternatively, the survey probed respondents on perceived inclusion and exclusion errors. 17% and 62% of	The VCPCs and districts did not systematically conduct household surveys to document how households met eligibility criteria.
	Exclusion error – Target <10%		

<sup>75</sup> Out of the 21,972 households for which the cash collector’s gender was specified, 11,653 cash collectors were women.

		respondents considered that there were inclusion <sup>76</sup> and exclusion errors. <sup>77</sup>	
	% of community aware of the complaint procedures - Target: 85%	57% (n= 398) of survey respondents <sup>78</sup> thought that if they have a suggestion or a problem with the assistance/service, they could pass on the suggestion or make a complaint.	Household survey. There are no secondary data specifically on the awareness of complaint procedures to triangulate the data from this question (whose primary objective was not to answer this indicator).
	% of community aware of targeting criteria - Target: 85%	85% of survey respondents were aware of the two main features of the household targeting, i.e. it was based on targeting criteria and run by the TA and VCPCs. When tested, FGD participants were usually aware of the targeting criteria.	Focus Group Discussions Survey
	% of beneficiaries having to travel more than 1 hour to distribution - Target: less than 25%	The districts organized the distributions in the GVH which means that in most cases, the distribution site was less than 1 hour away.  Furthermore, only 9% of survey respondents complained about the fact that "the distribution site was too far away."	Key Informant Interviews Focus Group Discussions Survey

<sup>76</sup> Do you know people who did not need the assistance who were included in the assistance/service provided?

<sup>77</sup> Do you know people who need assistance who have been excluded from the assistance/service provided?

<sup>78</sup> 39% replied "Yes absolutely", 15% "rather yes" and 3% "neutral".

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Outcome 2: Improve implementation time for assistance for targeted households	First contact with targeted beneficiaries within 120 days of the ARC payout being received.	<p>In districts with a programme duration of 4 and 5 months, the initial contact occurred in October and November 2022, meeting the established targets.</p> <p>In contrast, in other districts, the contact took place in December 2022 and January 2023. Despite surpassing the 120-day timeframe, the communication strategy generally aligned with the FIP, which to reach recipients the month before the start of the depletion of household’s food reserves, which in some districts is more than the 120-day timeframe laid out in the ARC SOP. The exception was noted in districts where the targeting occurred in January instead of December, as household food reservers were depleted by then.<sup>79</sup></p>	<p>Key Informant Interviews</p> <p>Focus Group Discussions</p> <p>Survey</p> <p>Final report<sup>80</sup></p>
	Activity completed within 180 days.	<p>The distributions in districts receiving cash assistance took place in January and February 2023, which was 210 days after the payout notification.</p> <p>As explained in section <a href="#">3.3</a>, most households received the equivalent of</p>	<p>Key Informant Interviews</p> <p>Focus Group Discussions</p> <p>Survey</p> <p>Final report<sup>81</sup></p>

<sup>79</sup> MVAC, ‘IPC Acute Food Security Analysis - June 2022-March 2023’.

<sup>80</sup> Government of Malawi, ‘Report On The Implementation Of The Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payout Funding Under The 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme’.

<sup>81</sup> Government of Malawi.



2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi





		one month less assistance than communicated to them. Despite the initial plan for the distribution of maize support being outlined in another funding stream, at the time of data collection in December 2023, the additional distribution had not taken place.	
Output 2.1 Timely provision of assistance to affected households	Actual time taken to roll out the response from ARC payout data against plan.	No data. Please refer to section 4. Standard operating procedures (SOPs): levels of compliance by the Government for information on these indicators.  The plans referred to this indicator are not defined, which makes the measurement of these indicators by the ET not possible.	
	Actual time taken to provide to targeted households against planned time.		
	Actual time taken to complete activity against planned time.		

## 4. Standard operating procedures: levels of compliance by the Government

### 4.1 SOP assessment: audit matrix

70. The traffic light scoring system below has been adopted to determine compliance with standard operating procedures (SOP).

**Table 25: Rating system to evaluate the level of compliance with the SOPs**

Colour	Meaning
	<b>Green, successful</b> - no problem or minor problem.
	<b>Yellow, acceptable</b> - the reasons for the variations are acceptable, but should be used as a learning tool for the future.
	<b>Red, failure</b> - failure to meet audit criteria with implications for the success of the programme.
	<b>Grey, not assessed</b> - the standing instruction does not reflect the situation that has actually been implemented and therefore cannot be assessed by the assessment team.

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Standing instruction (number and title)	Department/ person responsible	Expected completion date	Completion time (in days)	Degree of compliance	Comments	Source(s) Proof(s)
<b>Information and planning processes</b>						
<b>SOP1:</b> Monitoring food security levels	MVAC DODMA	Ongoing	21		<b>Compliant:</b> The entire process to collect data on food security and agricultural production after the end of the agricultural season until the publication of the MVAC report was a continuous process. It started in March 2022 with the planning of the data collection that took place in April. The analysis and reporting of the data were carried out from May to June 2022, and informed the design of the FIP.	Qualitative interviews Op <sup>82</sup> FIP <sup>83</sup>
<b>SOP2:</b> Updating contact databases	DODMA	June 2022	10		<b>Compliant:</b> The contact databases are constantly updated by DODMA, which oversees the disaster risk management institutional structure and was in charge of the coordination of the LS-FIRP.	Qualitative interviews LS-FIRP <sup>84</sup>
<b>SOP3:</b> Obtaining needs assessment results	DODMA MVAC	June 2022	10		<b>Partially compliant:</b> The MVAC report was published on 8 August 2022, after the report had been peer-reviewed by the IPC Global Support Unit. As the IPC is a global methodology, this review is mandatory before any publication of IPC result. While the assessment results were a month late, this had no impact on the implementation, given preliminary results were discussed and analysed by the TWG in June and given an anticipated start date of the distribution in October/November 2022.	Qualitative interviews FIP <sup>85</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Operations Plan Malawi (ARC)'.

<sup>83</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Malawi Draft FIP-ARC Drought Plan', Unknown.

<sup>84</sup> Government of Malawi, '2022/2023 National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan'.

<sup>85</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Malawi Draft FIP-ARC Drought Plan'.

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

<b>SOP4:</b> Inform partners of payout	DODMA	As soon as communication on final payment is made	10		<b>Not assessed:</b> The assessment of this SOP was hindered by a lack of documentation. Furthermore, during interviews, participants were unable to recall events and dates with sufficient accuracy.	
<b>SOP5:</b> Convene coordination meetings	DODMA	As soon as the possibility of payout is identified			<b>Compliant:</b> Several coordination meetings were held, notably with the development of the FIP and LS-FIRP. Both documents specified the targeting, modality selection and design, the implementation, as well as other Accountability to Affected Population (AAP) and Gender mainstreaming considerations.	
<b>Financial processes</b>						
<b>SOP6:</b> Notification to the financial institution to receive funding from the ARC	Ministry of Finance	30 days before payout	10		<b>Not assessed:</b> The assessment of this SOP was hindered by a lack of documentation. Furthermore, during interviews, participants were unable to recall events and dates with sufficient accuracy.	
<b>SOP7:</b> Notification to implementing partners of fund transfer	DODMA	At least 30 days before payout	10		<b>Not assessed:</b> The assessment of this SOP was hindered by a lack of documentation. Furthermore, during interviews, participants were unable to recall events and dates with sufficient accuracy.	
<b>SOP8:</b> Verify the ARC funds national account	DODMA	At least 30 days before payout	10		<b>Not assessed:</b> The assessment of this SOP was hindered by a lack of documentation. Furthermore, during interviews, participants were unable to recall events and dates with sufficient accuracy.	
<b>Operational processes</b>						
<b>SOP9:</b> Targeting and registration – identification of VE beneficiaries	DODMA, EPD, MOGCDSW	As soon as payout is confirmed	5		<b>Partially compliant:</b> The selection of households eligible for an additional top-up seems to have occurred in September and October, a notable deviation from the timeline initially planned in	Qualitative interviews

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

					the SOP. Nevertheless, this discrepancy can be attributed to the anticipated delivery dates set by the programme, see <a href="#">4.2 Compliance with the SOP: main findings</a> ). As a result, the ET deemed this significant delay acceptable, given the circumstances.	
<b>SOP10:</b> Identify additional beneficiaries and update beneficiaries lists	District councils	As soon as payout is confirmed	20		<b>Partially compliant:</b> The selection of households seems to have occurred in September 2022 and February and 2023, a notable deviation from the timeline initially planned in the SOP. This discrepancy can be attributed to the anticipated delivery dates set by the programme, based on the duration of assistance to households, ranging from 2 to 6 months depending on the districts (see <a href="#">4.2 Compliance with the SOP: main findings</a> ). Noteworthy, in some districts, the delivery took place later, with households receiving the support after having depleted their reserves, which goes against the programme’s logic (see <a href="#">5.2 Timely action of the Government interventions</a> ). As this appeared in a limited number of locations, the ET deemed this significant delay acceptable, given the circumstances.	Qualitative interviews Household surveys Focus Group Discussions Final report <sup>86</sup>
<b>SOP11:</b> Assess completeness of list of beneficiaries in each identified district/country	DODMA, EPD, MOGCDSW	As soon as payout is confirmed	20			
<b>SOP12:</b> Expand field staff to address registration/beneficiary list issues for expanded operations (if scalable operation)	DODMA, EPD, MOGCDSW	As soon as payout is confirmed	20			
<b>SOP13-15:</b> Launch of the procurement process (until the initiation)	DODMA NFRA	Once funds received	24		<b>Compliant:</b> By taking the maize from the National Strategic Grain Reserve, the programme had access to maize when needed. While no documents were shared with the ET about the procurement process, interviewees suggested that it was launched in September, which is coherent with was planned in the OP.	Qualitative interviews Op <sup>87</sup>

<sup>86</sup> Government of Malawi, ‘Report On The Implementation Of The Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payout Funding Under The 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme’.

<sup>87</sup> Government of Malawi, ‘Operations Plan Malawi (ARC)’.

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

<p><b>SOP16:</b> Verify functionality of existing systems (food transfer distribution, cash transfer systems, etc.) are in place, functional and can handle additional caseload</p>	<p>EPD, MoGCDSW</p>	<p>Once funds received</p>	<p>14</p>	<p style="background-color: #cccccc;"></p>	<p><b>Not assessed:</b> The assessment of this SOP was hindered by a lack of documentation.</p>	
<p><b>SOP17:</b> Monitoring and evaluation</p>	<p>DODMA, EPD, MOGCDSW</p>	<p>Once funds received</p>	<p>10</p>	<p style="background-color: #ff0000;"></p>	<p><b>Non-compliant:</b> There was no analysis of staffing requirements, no significant M&amp;E budget, and no development of M&amp;E tools to meet the monitoring and evaluation framework requirement laid out in the Operational Plans. Although the FIP describes with accuracy the on-site monitoring, output monitoring and post-distribution monitoring, the ET could not find any evidence that those took place. While some forms of on-site and output monitoring undeniably took place, these were not formally documented. Furthermore, no PDM was conducted.</p>	<p>Qualitative interviews Focus Group Discussions FIP<sup>88</sup> Final report<sup>89</sup></p>

<sup>88</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Malawi Draft FIP-ARC Drought Plan'.

<sup>89</sup> Government of Malawi, 'Report On The Implementation Of The Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payout Funding Under The 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme'.

## 4.2 Compliance with the SOPs: main findings

71. As explained in the [Limitations](#), **the lack of access to internal documents**, i.e. official letters, meeting minutes, etc., **hindered in two ways the assessment of the compliance with SOPs agreed on in the FIP**. First, the ET could not assess the compliance with some SOPs, notably the financial processes. Second, the ET could not determine with accuracy the dates of the notification and payment of the payout, which are two critical dates from which SOPs' deadlines are calculated. Based on key informant interviews, the ET estimated that the notification of the payout took place at the end of May<sup>90</sup> and the payout in September 2022.<sup>91</sup>
72. For the SOPs that were assessed, the analysis of compliance revealed that most of them were followed and there were minimal breaches with ARC SOPs in general. Importantly, these breaches did **not have a major impact on the success of the programme**.
73. Firstly, there were deviations from the provisional timetable, particularly with the needs assessment and the targeting of beneficiaries taking longer than initially planned. However, it is important to note that, in the context of this payout, **the agreed-upon deadlines did not align well with the design of the lean season response plan**. Given the methodology and the multisectoral nature of the MVAC, the proposed completion time of 10 days seems unrealistic. Moreover, the programme design aimed for the delivery of assistance to households just before their food gap. For instance, in districts with a five-month assistance duration, the delivery was intended to take place at the end of October to ensure that households received the assistance when it was most needed. Alternatively, in districts with a two-month duration, delivery would have been planned for January. Consequently, a 60-day duration for completing the targeting and registration process was similarly deemed unfeasible in this context.
74. **Secondly, there were deviations from the planned activities, notably with the monitoring plan designed as part of the response not being implemented by the districts**. According to interviewees, on-site monitoring and output monitoring occurred, but inconsistently. When these activities did take place, there was no evidence of the visits being formalized and contributing to a nationwide Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) plan. Additionally, the PDM did not occur. The reasons for the absence of these activities were attributed to both a lack of budget to undertake them and a lack of clearly delineated roles and responsibilities.

---

<sup>90</sup> The date considered for the assessment of the compliance with the SOP was 31 May 2022.

<sup>91</sup> The date considered for the assessment of the compliance with the SOP was 15 September 2022.

## 5. Efficiency and effectiveness of the Government interventions

### 5.1 Cost to Transfer ratio for the implementation of interventions

75. The overall Cost to Transfer ratio<sup>92</sup> (CTR) of the 2022 payout was 0.11, indicating that **it cost USD 0.11 to deliver USD 1 to beneficiaries**. Such a CTR demonstrates that the programme was very cost efficient.<sup>93</sup> However, it is important to consider a caveat in this analysis: ARC's contribution to the LS-FIRP and the allocation of expenses among partners may have differed.<sup>94</sup> Since the ET did not have access to a detailed LS-FIRP budget, this limitation could not be fully ascertained.

76. **Cash transfers were more cost-efficient than in-kind distribution.** When disaggregating by modality of assistance, the CTR for the cash transfer is 0.01 whereas the CTR for maize distribution is 0.17.<sup>95</sup> Although the value of goods is higher for in-kind assistance than for cash transfers, two expenses, i.e. the "Handling cost for maize" and "Transporter hiring costs", are specific to IKA and account for the comparatively higher cost structure of this method.

**Table 13: Cost to transfer ratio**

	Cash Transfers (MWK)	In-kind Assistance (MWK)	Overall (MWK)
Value of goods/transfers	5,588,675,000.00	7,700,000,000.00	13,288,675,000.00
Handling cost for maize		137,600,346.00	137,600,346.00
Transporter hiring costs		1,100,437,567.61	1,100,437,567.61
Community sensitization and beneficiary registration	45,286,516.62	62,395,143.38	107,681,660.00
Distribution, supervision and monitoring by DoDMA and other central level stakeholders	27,589,765.56	38,012,801.74	65,602,567.30
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,661,551,282.17</b>	<b>9,038,445,858.743</b>	<b>14,699,997,140.91</b>
<b>CTR</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.11</b>

77. **The cash transfers for the 2021–2022 ARC payout were significantly more cost efficient than for the 2016–2017 payout.** When calculating the CTR based on the

<sup>92</sup> Cost of delivery / Value of Goods and Transfers.

<sup>93</sup> A meta evaluation conducted in 2016 shows that the average CTR for programs transferring more than USD 50 is on average 0.66. ADE and ECHO, 'Evaluation of the Use of Different Transfer Modalities in ECHO Humanitarian Aid Actions 2011-2014', 2016.

<sup>94</sup> According to one interviewee, the World Bank contributed more heavily to the delivery costs than ARC funding as per the 2022 Lean Response Plan.

<sup>95</sup> The expenses "Community sensitization and beneficiary registration", "Distribution, supervision and monitoring by DoDMA and other central level stakeholders" were allocated to each modality based on the total value transferred to communities.



data<sup>96</sup> in the process evaluation of the 2016–2017 African Risk Capacity Payout in Malawi report, the CTR was 1.89, i.e. it cost USD 1.89 to deliver USD 1 of cash to beneficiaries. The scale of the response (103,085 households<sup>97</sup> for the 2021–2022 payout vs. 57,016 households for the 2016–2017 payout) and the transfer value (MWK 50,000 for the 2021–2022 payout vs. MWK 8,892 for the 2016–2017 payout)<sup>98</sup> are two key drivers explaining why the 2021–2022 payout was more cost efficient. Yet, when controlling for scale and transfer value,<sup>99</sup> the current payout remains significantly more cost efficient. These cost-efficiency gains can be explained by the percentage of cost of delivery vis-à-vis the total budget. The 2018 evaluation found that the cost of delivery represented 65 percent of the total cash transfer budget and highlighted this as a major concern in its findings and proposed a recommendation for the GoM.<sup>100</sup> Comparatively, this time around, the cost of delivery represented 12.5 percent of the total cash transfer budget and is the primary driver explaining these efficiency gains. The most likely cost driver comes from the fact that this programme was implemented directly by the GOM, with districts absorbing some of the costs of implementation on their own budget.

**78. There was a clear trade-off between the high cost-efficiency of the response and the accuracy and accountability of the targeting.** Various interviewees at the central and district levels complained about the lack of funding to train and monitor the ACPCs and VCPCs, and to carry out systematic verifications of community-based targeting and thus to effectively act as a watchdog to community chiefs and VCPCs not following the JEFAP targeting criteria and process, and to investigate the complaints received. Furthermore, five interviewees acknowledged that the current funding of the “Community sensitization and beneficiary registration” budget was insufficient, if DoDMA considered systematizing the HE and using the UBR (via the Emergency IMIS available at the Ministry of Gender, Community Development and Social Welfare) as this was piloted in Nkhatabay for the 2021–2022 payout with the support of UNICEF. According to a recent World Bank study,<sup>101</sup> a good estimate of the targeting cost would be from 1.5 percent to 5.5 percent of the value of transfers. Therefore, the “Community sensitization and beneficiary registration” should be from MWK 83,830,125 to MWK 307,377,125 against MWK 45,286,516.

---

<sup>96</sup> The Value of Transfers was MWK 5,070,340,000 and the cost of delivery was 959,703,075.

<sup>97</sup> African Center for Social Research and Economic Development, ‘Process Evaluation of the 2016/ 2017 African Risk Capacity (ARC) Payout in Malawi’, November 2018.

<sup>98</sup> African Center for Social Research and Economic Development.

<sup>99</sup> The ET recalculated the CTR of the 2021–2022 payout with a caseload of 57,016 households and a transfer value MWK 8,892. With those parameters, the CTR for the cash transfers of the 2021–2022 payout amounts to 0.14.

<sup>100</sup> The ET recalculated the CTR of the 2021–2022 payout with a caseload of 57,016 households and a transfer value MWK 8,892. With those parameters, the CTR for the cash transfers of the 2021–2022 payout amounts to 0.14.

<sup>101</sup> Pascale Schnitzer and Quentin Stoeffler, ‘Targeting for Social Safety Nets - Evidence from Nine Programs in the Sahel’, October 2021.

**5.2 Timely action of the Government interventions**

- 79. **The programme had planned to distribute assistance either in the month preceding the depletion of households' food reserves or at the beginning of the month when they would have been most in need.** According to interviewees, the rationale for timing the distribution to align with the period of greatest need was to encourage recipients to use the cash assistance and in-kind aid for their intended purpose, specifically addressing food security needs, and to deter resorting to negative coping strategies. Consequently, this translated into the targeting taking place a month before the planned distribution month, ensuring sufficient time for targeting, registration and subsequent distribution.
  
- 80. In Malawi, the lean season typically starts in October of each year.<sup>102</sup> The number of months of food deficit for households fluctuates in each district depending on the severity of the drought and the resulting crop failure. For the 2022–2023 lean season, the MVAC assessment planned for three to five deficit months for affected households, which means that that **the distribution should have taken place between October 2022 and January 2023**, as summarized in the table below.

**Table 14: Food deficit months and distribution months for districts covered by ARC funding**

Food Deficit Months	District covered by ARC funding	Latest distribution month
3 months	Chipita, Dedza, Dowa, Karonga, Kasungu, Mchinji, NkhataBay, Ntcheu, Ntchisi, Rumphu, Salima, Thyolo	January
4 months	Chikwawa, Mwanza, Neno	December
5 months	Nsanje	November

- 81. **The Government seemed to have initiated the distribution of assistance in November and December 2022, as scheduled in the districts covered with IKA,** such as Chikwawa, Nsanje and Mwanza.<sup>103</sup> One significant factor contributing to the timeliness of maize distribution was the programme's capacity to use maize stocked in the SGR,<sup>104</sup> rather than having to procure maize before distribution.
  
- 82. **In terms of cash delivery, the distribution period extended from mid-January to the end of March 2023, resulting in a general delay of two to four weeks compared with the original schedule,** as captured in the table below. Based on the

<sup>102</sup> FEWSNET, 'Malawi Key Message Update: Crisis (IPC Phase 3) Expected amid High Food Prices and Insufficient Assistance, September 2023', n.d.

<sup>103</sup> The team only considered Chikwawa and Nsanje for the IKA, as the ET based the sampling strategy on the FIP (the ET did not have access to the final report during the inception phase).

<sup>104</sup> DODMA took the grain from the SGR, which was later replenished by the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA).

data collected during the evaluation, the ET was unable to determine the reasons behind this late distribution, though various suggestions came from interviews.<sup>105</sup>

**Table 15: Delivery months versus planned distribution month for districts visited by the ET**

Sampled Districts	Actual delivery month <sup>106</sup>	Planned distribution month	Timely or Late
Karonga	February	January	Late (by 1 month)
Nkhatabay	March	January	Late (by 2 months)
Mchinji	February	January	Late (by 1 month)
Dowa	February	January	Late (by 1 month)
Dedza	February	January	Late (by 1 month)
Mwanza	February	January	Late (by 1 month)

**83. Importantly, 71 percent of survey respondents (n=399) were satisfied with the timeliness of the delivery.**<sup>107</sup> The data from FGDs suggest that this relatively high level of satisfaction comes from the fact that the assistance arrived when beneficiaries had exhausted their food reserves and were using negative coping strategies, such as reducing the quality and quantity of meals (see paragraph 95). Despite overall satisfaction with the timeliness of the assistance, households expressed a preference for receiving it in January (91 percent of respondents, n=399) to maximize the positive effects on their food security.

### 5.3 Results achieved

84. This section complements the indicators available in section [Final implementation plan: actual results](#).

**85. Overall, 60 percent of beneficiaries (n=399) expressed satisfaction with the quantity of assistance received.** The primary reason for dissatisfaction among respondents was a perceived mismatch between the quantity provided and the extent of their needs. Satisfaction levels were notably higher among beneficiaries receiving in-kind assistance compared with those receiving cash assistance, attributable to two main factors. Firstly, the prices of food commodities rose during the implementation period. Secondly, respondents voiced grievances about not receiving the third month of assistance promised to them.<sup>108</sup>


<sup>105</sup> 1. Government official could not coordinate the targeting process in December 2022 due to the end of year workload; 2. With the reduction of the duration of the assistance, the delivery timeframe was adjusted accordingly, 3. There were delays transferring the fund to the districts for payments; 4. The size of the programmes.

<sup>106</sup> The actual distribution months came from the respondent survey (n=399).

<sup>107</sup> Replies to the question in the survey: "Has the support come at the right time to help you cope with the effects of the 2022 crop failure due to drought?"

<sup>108</sup> This was reported by 26% of respondents who were dissatisfied with the quantity of assistance (n=117).

Figure 3: Level of satisfaction with the quantity of assistance received (n=399)



86. **This explains why the preferred modality elicited divergent opinions among beneficiaries.** Reflecting concerns about inflation driving up prices, survey results indicated a general preference for in-kind assistance (40 percent) over cash assistance (28 percent). Twenty-nine percent preferred a combination of both cash and in-kind assistance. However, FGD participants emphasized that cash assistance offered them greater flexibility in meeting their food needs.

87. **Regardless of the assistance modality, beneficiaries expressed a high level of satisfaction with the quality of the assistance they received, with an overall satisfaction rate of 84 percent (n=399).**<sup>109</sup> Those receiving in-kind assistance were generally content with the quality of the maize provided.<sup>110</sup> Among respondents who did express dissatisfaction with quality, those receiving cash assistance primarily complained about the monthly transfer value.

88. **The distribution process of the assistance garnered general satisfaction among beneficiaries, with 89 percent expressing contentment.** However, a small percentage (6 percent) indicated dissatisfaction with the process. The majority of dissatisfied respondents cited two main reasons: 35 percent (n=37) mentioned that distribution centres were located too far from their communities, while 70 percent felt that the waiting time to receive their assistance was excessively long. These challenges were largely attributed to logistical arrangements, particularly in geographically remote areas like Nkhatabay and Mwanza, where vehicle access may have been difficult.


89. **The waiting time at distribution sites varied significantly.** Fifty-six percent of respondents reported waiting for less than two hours, while 44 percent reported

<sup>109</sup> 55% of respondents replied that they were “very satisfied” or “satisfied” to the question “Are you, and your household, satisfied with the quality of the assistance you receive?”.

<sup>110</sup> Only three respondents complained about the presence of mould in the maize received.

waiting for two hours or more. There were no noticeable differences between districts in this regard.

**Figure 4: Average waiting time for beneficiaries on arrival at the distribution site (n=399)**



**90. FGDs with beneficiaries and the VCPCs revealed issues regarding the distribution process in certain villages.**

The district authorities informed the TA and VCPCs only a day before the distribution occurred. Consequently, some households either were not present during the distribution days or did not have their identification documents readily available.<sup>111</sup> There was no mechanism in place for households that missed the assistance to claim it afterwards.

**91. Irrespective of the modality, the distribution of assistance had not impacted market functionality.**

In general, 67 percent of respondents (n=399) had not noticed a reduction in the availability of food commodities after the delivery of assistance. While 54 percent of respondents had noticed a price increase in the food commodities available in the markets, the vast majority of beneficiaries concurred that the price had increased before the distribution of the assistance and was not related to the distribution, either cash assistance, in-kind assistance and mixed modalities.<sup>112</sup> This is confirmed by the price monitoring and the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) calculated conducted by WFP, which highlighted an inflation at country level during the pay-out implementation.<sup>113</sup>

**92. The programme did not take the gender dimension into account in its planning<sup>114</sup> nor in its implementation (targeting and distribution).**

The dedicated gender department is a recent creation within ARC,<sup>115</sup> and support is planned for 2024 to systematically integrate gender considerations into the plans.

**5.4 Positive perceptions of outcome**

**93. Before receiving assistance, 87 percent (n=399) of households resorted to negative coping strategies to meet their food needs.**


Two strategies were particularly prevalent: 64 percent (n=374) of households engaged in part-time or full-time casual

<sup>111</sup> Used by another programme of fertilizer distribution whose distribution took place on the same day.  
<sup>112</sup> FGDs with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and VCPCs.  
<sup>113</sup> Based on the review of the monthly “Minimum Expenditure Basket Round: What it Costs for a Household to Survive a Month” in 2022 and 2023 produced by WFP and available on <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/southern-africa/malawi/reports>  
<sup>114</sup> No information on gender and how it is taken into account is mentioned in the OPs and PDMOs.  
<sup>115</sup> African Risk Capacity, "ARC Group Strategy 2020-24", 2020.

labour to earn income for food, thereby sacrificing time in their primary occupations. Fifty-nine percent reduced the frequency or quality of meals.<sup>116</sup>

94. With 94 percent of households reporting to having been affected by the drought, **the assistance was recognized for its role in cushioning households during periods of food shortage**. The primary impact was noted in households' ability to increase meal quantity or quality (82 percent, n=284). The secondary impact has been on school attendance, with households sending their children back to school (15%).<sup>117</sup>

**Figure 5: Negative coping strategies used before the assistance (n=113)**



95. **The delivery of assistance after the start of the lean season (5.2 Timely action of the Government interventions) compelled some households to adopt or continue to use negative coping strategies.** These included ongoing reductions in meal quality or quantity. Additionally, in anticipation of forthcoming assistance, 34 percent (n=113) borrowed food or money from relatives. Other strategies involved

<sup>116</sup> Other strategies include borrowing food or money (19%), migration of one or more members (15%), selling livestock or other goods (13%), buying on credit (6%).

<sup>117</sup> Other positive impact included: "My household was able to buy livestock or inputs or work more in its farming activities" (6%) and "My household was able to buy livestock or inputs or work more in its farming activities" (5%).

selling livestock or assets to meet food needs (19 percent), purchasing food on credit (14 percent), and seeking paid work, either by migrating to Zambia (14 percent) or working as daily labourers (12 percent). While the timely delivery of assistance is inherently challenging considering the scale of a county-wide food security programme, the one-month delay in distribution had a negative impact on the programme's effectiveness, affecting households' ability to cope with the food deficit.

96. Although the assistance was mainly consumed by households,<sup>118</sup> **approximately a quarter<sup>119</sup> of recipients shared part of their assistance with relatives and community members.** Consequently, the assistance also contributed to the food security of non-recipients and had positive effects on community cohesion. One participant in a focus group discussion in Mwanza expressed this sentiment, stating, "How could I be cooking and eating with my family when my neighbours and relatives have nothing?".
97. In most instances, sharing the assistance was voluntary and an attempt by households receiving assistance to support other family members an relative, thus leading to bonding social capital. However, **in about 20 percent of cases, the sharing of assistance was enforced by the chief** due to the disparity between the number of households affected by the drought and the caseload at the village level, as well as a level of distrust associated with categorical targeting.<sup>120</sup>
98. Although these redistribution mechanisms have unexpected positive effects on social cohesion within communities, particularly in a context where targeting is only partially understood by communities as this was the case in communities visited by the evaluation team, they may help to explain the **low level of satisfaction among beneficiaries regarding the quantity distributed** (see paragraph 84).
99. **Another critical factor contributing to the dissatisfaction with the quantity of assistance is the duration of support and the adequacy of the transfer value..** The effective duration of the assistance was of only two months, a month less than the food deficit (leaving a deficit of one month compared with the duration needed to address food shortages adequately)<sup>121122</sup> and two months less than the requested duration of the assistance.<sup>123</sup>
100. Moreover, the value of the assistance package fell short of meeting households' monthly food requirements. In December 2022, the monthly cost of the food ration under the SMEB varied across different regions of the country, averaging

---

<sup>118</sup> 97% of beneficiaries said they had used the assistance for their own consumption (n=351).

<sup>119</sup> Data from the survey and FGD with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

<sup>120</sup> This was mentioned by interviewees at district levels.

<sup>121</sup> MVAC, 'IPC Acute Food Security Analysis - June 2022-March 2023'.

<sup>122</sup> Based on interviews with government representative, the duration of the assistance was reduced by one month in most locations due to the combination of a funding shortage (less funds obtained than planned in the LS-FIRP) and the occurrence of new natura disaster towards the end of the implementation period (cyclone Freddie).

<sup>123</sup> Beneficiaries have highlighted that the optimal duration for assistance should have been four months.

MWK 75,000.<sup>124</sup> Given that the transfer value represented only 33 percent of the SMEB for food, this explained recipients' perception that the quantity of assistance was insufficient.

## 6. Learning for future process audits

**101. Overall, the programme has been successful considering its scale and the satisfaction of recipients with the assistance provided, contributing effectively to targeted household food security** in line with the LS-FIRP objectives. However, as this evaluation primarily focuses on process assessment, findings regarding the effectiveness and impact of the assistance are limited. Nevertheless, the limited findings suggest promising outcomes, although these outcomes were heavily affected by the duration of the assistance and the transfer value.

**102. Several process-related issues during implementation warrant attention for future improvements for a payout:**

- Failure to systematically follow the JEFAP process and targeting criteria by districts.
- Lack of accountability in addressing inclusion and exclusion errors, coupled with the absence of functioning complaints and feedback channels.
- Overall delay of one month in the distribution timeframe.

103. While it proved challenging to determine exhaustively the reasons behind these issues, **all three issues pointed out to a common denominator, i.e. insufficient funding provisioned at the district level** to enable district officials to effectively monitor and follow up the intervention, as shown by the lack of monitoring visits and data. While the programme's cost-efficiency is commendable, the minimal allocation for delivery costs resulted in trade-offs in organizational and time efficiency due to resource constraints. Should a further payout take place, the TWG should consider budgeting sufficient resources to ensure that the timing of the distribution and monitoring plans go ahead as planned in the FIP.

**104. The evaluation team wishes to highlight several important points regarding the evaluation process.** Firstly, there were delays and incompleteness in retrieving documentation. To streamline this process, it is suggested to compile a comprehensive list of required documents and evidence, to scan them and submit them to ARC along with the final report. This would minimize the need for multiple reminders and maximize the benefits during the start-up phase. In cases where there is a scarcity of available documents, the evaluation could adapt its methodology by considering alternative primary data collection methods, such as process mapping.

---

<sup>124</sup> World Food Programme, 'Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket in Malawi- What It Costs for a Household to Survive a Month. Round 64: November 2022', n.d.



105. **The timing of this process evaluation** occurs relatively late compared with the implementation phase. It would be more suitable to shorten the timeframe between the completion of distributions and data collection by a few weeks or even a few months. This adjustment would ensure that respondents have a fresher understanding of both the challenges and successes encountered during distributions.
106. **The evaluation report lacks a dedicated section on gender considerations and accountability to beneficiaries**, despite these being central to the evaluation's objectives. It is recommended to revise the report's structure to incorporate these topics adequately. This recommendation extends to both the FIP and the OP, which should include detailed sections addressing these aspects. Additionally, sections 5.3 and 5.4 could be merged or reorganized, with one section focusing on process indicators and the other on outcome indicators.

## 7. Recommendations

#	Recommendations	Corresponding sections	Person responsible	Provisional timetable
1	<b>Recommendation 1: Revise the budget allocation for a future payout to increase the delivery costs</b>			
1.1	<b>Proposed action 1.1:</b> Increase the funds allocated to “Community sensitization and beneficiary registration” and “Distribution, supervision and monitoring by DoDMA and other central level stakeholders”.	Paragraph 78	DODMA TWG	Next OP and FIP
1.2	<b>Proposed action 1.2:</b> Introduce a mandatory minimum budget to fund M&E activities to measure the immediate results of assistance. <sup>125</sup>	Paragraphs 67, 68, 78	DODMA TWG	Next OP and FIP
2	<b>Recommendation 2: Improve monitoring and evaluation (M&amp;E) of the payout</b>			
2.1	<b>Proposed action 2.1:</b> Revise the M&E plan presented in the FIP and OP to bring it into line with planned operations and objectives. This plan should include outcome and process indicators <sup>126</sup> and should clearly define them.	Paragraphs 68 & 74	DODMA TWG	Next OP and FIP
2.2	<b>Proposed action 2.2:</b> Develop data collection tools for the monitoring visits and PDM conducted by the districts and DODMA based on the M&E plan.	Paragraphs 66, 67, 68 et 74	DODMA	Before the next lean season response
2.3	<b>Proposed action 2.3:</b> Clarify the roles and responsibilities, timeframe and deliverables for the monitoring between DODMA and the districts.	Paragraphs 66, 66 & 74	DODMA	Before the next lean season response

<sup>125</sup> The norm in the sector is to allocate between 3% and 10% of the project/programme budget to monitoring and evaluation. IFRC, "Guide to programme monitoring and evaluation", 2011.

<sup>126</sup> 'Multipurpose Outcome Indicators and Guidance', *The CALP Network* (blog), accessed 9 May 2022, <https://www.calpnetwork.org/publication/multipurpose-outcome-indicators-and-guidance/>.

3	<b>Recommendation 3: Review the targeting methodology in order to reduce the exclusion and inclusion error rate.</b>			
3.1	<b>Proposed action 3.1:</b> Clarify steps and expectations with the JEFAP process with regard to household visits, complaints and feedback mechanisms and community meetings.	Paragraphs 47, 48; 49 & 51	DODMA Districts Other actors using the JEFAP (e.g WFP)	Before the next lean season response
3.2	<b>Proposed action 3.2:</b> Design a standard tool for household visits and a database to register recipients to ensure consistency in the targeting and registration. For instance, collecting the gender of cash collectors, which was not done systematically in all districts.	Paragraphs 47 & 48	DODMA	Before the next lean season response
3.3	<b>Proposed action 3.3:</b> Continue building the capacity of the districts, ACPCs and VCPCs to effectively use the JEFAP process and criteria.	Section 3.1	DODMA Districts	Before the next lean season response
3.4	<b>Proposed action 3.4:</b> Set targets for the districts for the monitoring of community visits. For instance, DODMA could require districts to randomly visit 25% of villages.	Paragraphs 49 & 51	DODMA Districts	Before the next lean season response
4	<b>Recommendation 4: Invest into accountability to affected populations</b>			
4.1	<b>Proposed action 4.1:</b> Put up information posters in each village on the different complaint channels: oral complaints to the TA and/or VCPC, complaint boxes and hotline.	Paragraph 51	Districts MGCDWSW	Next OP and FIP
4.2	<b>Proposed action 4.2:</b> Set up a redress mechanism to ensure that exclusion errors can be investigated, and if needed, included in the assistance.	Paragraph 52	DODMA MGCDWSW Districts	Next OP and FIP
5	<b>Recommendation 5: Timeliness of the response</b>			
5.1	<b>Proposed action 5.1:</b> Start the targeting and registration two months before the intended distribution month to ensure that the delivery occurs before the deficit month.	Paragraph 60	DODMA Districts	Next payout implementation

5.2	<b>Proposed action 5.2:</b> Revise the SOP deadlines so they are realistic and tailored to the context of the lean season response in Malawi.	Section 4.1	TWG ARC	Next OP and FIP
5.3	<b>Proposed action 5.3:</b> Revise the FIP and report's structure to incorporate gender section	Paragraph 106	ARC	TBD by ARC
6	<b>Recommendation 6: Internal Learning</b>			
6.1	<b>Proposition action 6.1:</b> Develop a management response sheet for recommendations arising from process and impact evaluations. This evaluation has revealed areas for improvement that were previously identified in the 2018 payout process evaluation but were not addressed. <sup>127</sup> Additionally, while some recommendations seem to have been implemented, <sup>128</sup> it is unclear whether this was intentional. Hence, the TWG should create a management response sheet to document the acceptance level of recommendations and propose an action plan for those that are accepted.	Paragraphs 68 & 75	TWG	Next OP and FIP
6.2	<b>Proposition action 6.2:</b> As part of the SOP in the FIP, set a timeframe for the process evaluation to ensure that the data collection takes place at the latest six months after the distribution;	Paragraphs 25, 26 et 105	ARC	Next OP and FIP

<sup>127</sup> The involvement of abuse of power of local leaders in the selection of recipients, the lack of recipients database or post-distribution monitoring, and the lack of centralisation of documents for the evaluation team.

<sup>128</sup> Around the improvement of the cost-efficiency of the response and the use of the SGR to avoid procurement delays.

## **8. Annexes**

### **8.1 Terms of References**

#### **1. Background**

The African Risk Capacity was established as a Specialized Agency of the African Union (AU) in November 2012 to help Member States improve their capacities to better plan, prepare and respond to extreme weather events and disasters and to assist food insecure populations. Operating under the privileges and immunities of the AU, the ARC Agency, through its Secretariat, provides Member States with capacity-building services for early warning, contingency planning and risk finance. It currently counts 32 AU countries as members and is supervised by a Governing Board elected by member states and the African Union Commission.

In July 2020, the African Risk Capacity Insurance Company Limited (ARC Ltd) made payouts of USD14 249 461 to the Government of Malawi in parametric drought risk insurance payouts to support the extensive drought response efforts in the country. Through Food assistance and cash 350,205 beneficiaries were targeted.

#### **2. The purpose of the evaluation**

The purpose of this process evaluation is to generate information and learning that ARC agency, the government of Malawi, and other Member States and ARC's partners will use for accountability and to improve the contingency planning and its implementation process with the ultimate goal to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of ARC's payout implementation and its impact on the beneficiaries.

#### **3. Objectives the process evaluation**

The process evaluation aims to assess whether or not the contingency plans are implemented as initially planned in terms of processes and management. Thus, it focuses on the operations, the implementation, and the delivery of the country approved Final Implementation Plans (FIP). Furthermore, it gives insight on the program reach, the quality of the implementation, and the satisfaction of the beneficiaries.

#### **4. The scope**

As indicated earlier, the Government of Malawi received a payout totalling 14 249 461 USD following a drought event. These payouts will contribute to funding the early response measures put in place by Government through the ARC Operational Plan mechanism. The payout to the Government will be used to support over 350,205 beneficiaries through food distribution and direct mobile cash disbursements. The targeted areas are as follow:

<b>Admin Level 1: Region/Province</b>	<b>Admin Level 2: District</b>
South	Mangochi
	Machinga
	Phalombe
	Neno
	Balaka
Lower Shire	Chikwawa
	Nsanje
North Cluster	Karonga
	Mzimba
	Rumphi
Centre Cluster	Kasungu
	Salima
	Dowa
	Ntcheu
South Cluster	Zomba
	Chiradzulu
	Blantyre
	Mwanza
	Mulanje
	Thyolo

Specifically, the process evaluation will cover the following areas:

- Assess the compliance with ARC standard operating procedures (SOPs) of Malawi Final Implementation Plan (FIP).
- Review of the interventions carried out with ARC's payout versus the interventions described in their respective Final Implementation plans.
- Effectiveness and efficiency of the FIP's interventions.
- Beneficiary perceptions of the programme delivery and programme outcomes
- Gender inclusiveness.

## **5. The evaluation questions**

The process evaluation will answer at minimum the following questions:

- To what extent activities carried out by the Government are consistent with the ones planned in the FIP?
- When did FIP activities take place?

- To whom were the FIP activities actually directed to and how this compares to the plan?
- To what extent did the FIP implementation achieve its expected results, including the timely delivery of relief assistance?
- What are the barriers/facilitators to the implementation of the FIP activities?
- How cost-efficient were the activities carried out?
- How well coordinated were the implementation of the activities supported by the payout with other relief programs across the country?
- Were ARC Standards Operating Procedures followed by the Government of Malawi during the implementation of the FIP, if not why?
- how gender objectives and mainstreaming principles were included in the interventions carried out by the Government of Malawi?

## 6. Approach and Methodology

A detailed methodology to cover the scope and to respond to the evaluation questions will be developed by the Evaluation Team following recommendations and using tools from ARC's "*Program Audit Guidelines*" (see appendix). The Evaluation methodology will be a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches for data collection and analysis. At a minimum, the Evaluation Team will undertake the following activities:

- a. **Conduct a desk review of the following key documents:** OPs, Final Implementation Plans and related amendments, FIP implementation interim reports from the Government of Malawi, Malawi disaster risk management plans and relevant pieces of legislation, ARV bulletins and other food security assessment reports, terms of references of the technical working groups and subgroups, ARC compliance rules and other appropriate ARC.
- b. **Develop a review matrix of the Standard Operating Procedure** of ARC to determine whether the appropriate steps were followed by the Government of Malawi and, if not, explain the deviations following the compliance rules of ARC.
- c. **Conduct Key Informant Interview with key stakeholders** including (but not limited to):
  - Country Engagement Manager (CEM) at ARC Secretariat
  - Contingency Planning Staff at the ARC Secretariat
  - M&E staff at the ARC Secretariat

- National Government Coordinator
- Members of the Technical Working Group
- Government officials at the Department of Disaster Management Affairs
- Administrative authorities (sub-national level)
- Implementing partners (national, sub-national and local level)
- Representatives of key humanitarian donors in Malawi
- Community leaders
- Involved Community-Based Organizations
- Beneficiaries (By gender).

d. **Conduct spot checks** consisting of:

- A quantitative survey based on a representative sample of beneficiary households to assess their perception on the payout implementation, delivery and outcomes;
- Verify stocks and distribution records;
- Witness project activities if on-going.

## 7. The Evaluation Team Requirements

The Evaluation Team Leader must be very experienced in program evaluation in the context of disaster management and responses. The team leader must have proven experience, qualifications and ability to deliver a quality product in a timely and efficient manner. Minimum qualifications and experience of the team members will include:

Job Title	Description of tasks	Knowledge and experience
<b>Evaluation Team Leader</b>	<p>Leads the Evaluation Team</p> <p>Coordinates and manages all activities related to evaluation planning and execution with the ARC Secretariat and ARC Government Coordinator in country</p> <p>Carry out process evaluation interviews and spot checks</p> <p>Oversees data analysis</p> <p>Author the evaluation report</p>	<p>- Master's degree in International Development, Disaster Management or related field</p> <p>- A minimum of ten years international professional experience in humanitarian evaluation and/or the field of disaster risk management and response</p> <p>- A solid understanding of the use and application of monitoring and evaluation systems</p> <p>- Experience of working in collaboration with high level government officials,</p>



Job Title	Description of tasks	Knowledge and experience
		donors, implementing partners and local communities - Excellent communication skills - Excellent analytical and problem solving skills - Excellent report writing skills
<b>Researcher (national)</b>	Carry out the spot checks Analyse the results of the spot checks Prepare an analytical report highlighting key findings from the spot checks	- Bachelor's degree in Social Sciences, Economics, Development Studies or related fields - A minimum of five years professional experience in the field of development or market research - Proven experience of carrying out field research: designing data collection tools interviewing stakeholders and recording results - Proven experience in data analysis and report writing - Excellent communication skills - Good report writing skills

**8. Deliverables and timelines**

The Evaluation Team shall be expected to prepare and submit to ARC a set of key reports in the course of undertaking this assignment. These reports shall be presented to the stakeholders, reviewed and approved by ARC before the final payment is processed. The following have been identified as key deliverables:

- a. **Inception report:** This shall be prepared and submitted within **ONE week** after the signing of the contract. The Evaluation Team will prepare this after reviewing key technical documents and after discussion with ARC. The inception report shall focus on: the understanding of the Terms of Reference and scope, the relevant methodology to be adopted, the evaluation design and key questions, and, the work-plan for the assignment. The Evaluation Team will be required to present the inception report to the stakeholders in Malawi.
- b. **Preliminary findings:** The preliminary findings should be compiled and presented to all the stakeholders involved in the implementation of the ARC financed intervention(s) during the in-country debriefing meeting, **FOUR weeks** after the signing of the contract.

- c. **Draft of the process evaluation report:** This shall be prepared and submitted to ARC, **SIX weeks** after the signing of the contract following the recommended outline (See appendix). The draft report will require feedback in form of comments, questions and inputs from ARC. In addition, the Evaluation Team will be required to present the Draft Report to stakeholders in Malawi and to ARC.
- d. **Final process evaluation report:** This shall be prepared following the recommended outline (See appendix) and submitted to ARC on, or before the expiry of the assignment (**SEVEN weeks** after the signing of the contract) after incorporating the comments/inputs on the presented Draft Report. This includes a master copy of the final report suitable for reproduction, and four copies, in full colour and bound, as well as soft copies.

## 9. Reporting arrangements

The Evaluation Team will report directly to the Senior M&E Officer of ARC.

## 10. The proposal

The proposal should include:

- A detailed elaboration of the understanding of the TOR
- A description of the evaluation plan including details of the proposed methodology, sampling, study design; analysis and reporting, and milestones for the evaluation and a timetable of activities.
- Detailed budget
- Past performance summaries (at least three brief descriptions of past or current contracting mechanisms for assignments similar in size, scope and complexity to this tender) and list of references that demonstrate performance in conducting similar evaluations
- CVs conforming to the qualifications listed above for the evaluation team
- Supporting documents including mandatory institutional documents such as incorporation papers

## 11. Background

The African Risk Capacity was established as a Specialized Agency of the African Union (AU) in November 2012 to help Member States improve their capacities to better plan, prepare and respond to extreme weather events and disasters and to assist food insecure populations. Operating under the privileges and immunities of the AU, the ARC Agency, through its Secretariat, provides Member States with capacity-building services for early warning, contingency planning and risk finance.

It currently counts 32 AU countries as members and is supervised by a Governing Board elected by member states and the African Union Commission.

In July 2020, the African Risk Capacity Insurance Company Limited (ARC Ltd) made payouts of USD14 249 461 to the Government of Malawi in parametric drought risk insurance payouts to support the extensive drought response efforts in the country. Through Food assistance and cash 350,205 beneficiaries were targeted.

**12. The purpose of the evaluation**

The purpose of this process evaluation is to generate information and learning that ARC agency, the government of Malawi, and other Member States and ARC’s partners will use for accountability and to improve the contingency planning and its implementation process with the ultimate goal to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of ARC’s payout implementation and its impact on the beneficiaries.

**13. Objectives the process evaluation**

The process evaluation aims to assess whether or not the contingency plans are implemented as initially planned in terms of processes and management. Thus, it focuses on the operations, the implementation, and the delivery of the country approved Final Implementation Plans (FIP). Furthermore, it gives insight on the program reach, the quality of the implementation, and the satisfaction of the beneficiaries.

**14. The scope**

As indicated earlier, the Government of Malawi received a payout totalling 14 249 461 USD following a drought event. These payouts will contribute to funding the early response measures put in place by Government through the ARC Operational Plan mechanism. The payout to the Government will be used to support over 350,205 beneficiaries through food distribution and direct mobile cash disbursements. The targeted areas are as follow:

Admin Level 1: Region/Province	Admin Level 2: District
South	Mangochi
	Machinga
	Phalombe
	Neno
	Balaka
Lower Shire	Chikwawa

	Nsanje
North Cluster	Karonga
	Mzimba
	Rumphi
Centre Cluster	Kasungu
	Salima
	Dowa
	Ntcheu
South Cluster	Zomba
	Chiradzulu
	Blantyre
	Mwanza
	Mulanje
	Thyolo

Specifically, the process evaluation will cover the following areas:

- Assess the compliance with ARC standard operating procedures (SOPs) of Malawi Final Implementation Plan (FIP).
- Review of the interventions carried out with ARC’s payout versus the interventions described in their respective Final Implementation plans.
- Effectiveness and efficiency of the FIP’s interventions.
- Beneficiary perceptions of the programme delivery and programme outcomes
- Gender inclusiveness.

### 15. The evaluation questions

The process evaluation will answer at minimum the following questions:

- To what extent activities carried out by the Government are consistent with the ones planned in the FIP?
- When did FIP activities take place?
- To whom were the FIP activities actually directed to and how this compares to the plan?
- To what extent did the FIP implementation achieve its expected results, including the timely delivery of relief assistance?
- What are the barriers/facilitators to the implementation of the FIP activities?
- How cost-efficient were the activities carried out?
- How well coordinated were the implementation of the activities supported by the payout with other relief programs across the country?

- Were ARC Standards Operating Procedures followed by the Government of Malawi during the implementation the FIP, if not why?
- how gender objectives and mainstreaming principles were included in the interventions carried out by the Government of Malawi?

## 16. Approach and Methodology

A detailed methodology to cover the scope and to respond to the evaluation questions will be developed by the Evaluation Team following recommendations and using tools from ARC's "*Program Audit Guidelines*" (see appendix). The Evaluation methodology will be a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches for data collection and analysis. At a minimum, the Evaluation Team will undertake the following activities:

- e. **Conduct a desk review of the following key documents:** Operations Plans, Final Implementation Plans and related amendments, FIP implementation interim reports from the Government of Malawi, Malawi disaster risk management plans and relevant pieces of legislation, ARV bulletins and other food security assessment reports, terms of references of the technical working groups and subgroups, ARC compliance rules and other appropriate ARC.
- f. **Develop a review matrix of the Standard Operating Procedure** of ARC to determine whether the appropriate steps were followed by the Government of Malawi and, if not, explain the deviations following the compliance rules of ARC.
- g. **Conduct Key Informant Interview with key stakeholders** including (but not limited to):
  - Country Engagement Manager (CEM) at ARC Secretariat
  - Contingency Planning Staff at the ARC Secretariat
  - M&E staff at the ARC Secretariat
  - National Government Coordinator
  - Members of the Technical Working Group
  - Government officials at the Department of Disaster Management Affairs
  - Administrative authorities (sub-national level)
  - Implementing partners (national, sub-national and local level)
  - Representatives of key humanitarian donors in Malawi
  - Community leaders
  - Involved Community-Based Organizations

- Beneficiaries (By gender).

h. **Conduct spot checks** consisting of:

- A quantitative survey based on a representative sample of beneficiary households to assess their perception on the payout implementation, delivery and outcomes;
- Verify stocks and distribution records;
- Witness project activities if on-going.

### 17. The Evaluation Team Requirements

The Evaluation Team Leader must be very experienced in program evaluation in the context of disaster management and responses. The team leader must have proven experience, qualifications and ability to deliver a quality product in a timely and efficient manner. Minimum qualifications and experience of the team members will include:

Job Title	Description of tasks	Knowledge and experience
<b>Evaluation Team Leader</b>	<p>Leads the Evaluation Team</p> <p>Coordinates and manages all activities related to evaluation planning and execution with the ARC Secretariat and ARC Government Coordinator in country</p> <p>Carry out process evaluation interviews and spot checks</p> <p>Oversees data analysis</p> <p>Author the evaluation report</p>	<p>- Master's degree in International Development, Disaster Management or related field</p> <p>- A minimum of ten years international professional experience in humanitarian evaluation and/or the field of disaster risk management and response</p> <p>- A solid understanding of the use and application of monitoring and evaluation systems</p> <p>- Experience of working in collaboration with high level government officials, donors, implementing partners and local communities</p> <p>- Excellent communication skills</p> <p>- Excellent analytical and problem solving skills</p> <p>- Excellent report writing skills</p>
<b>Researcher (national)</b>	<p>Carry out the spot checks</p> <p>Analyse the results of the spot checks</p>	<p>- Bachelor's degree in Social Sciences, Economics, Development Studies or related fields</p>

Job Title	Description of tasks	Knowledge and experience
	Prepare an analytical report highlighting key findings from the spot checks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A minimum of five years professional experience in the field of development or market research</li> <li>- Proven experience of carrying out field research: designing data collection tools interviewing stakeholders and recording results</li> <li>- Proven experience in data analysis and report writing</li> <li>- Excellent communication skills</li> <li>- Good report writing skills</li> </ul>

**18. Deliverables and timelines**

The Evaluation Team shall be expected to prepare and submit to ARC a set of key reports in the course of undertaking this assignment. These reports shall be presented to the stakeholders, reviewed and approved by ARC before the final payment is processed. The following have been identified as key deliverables:

- e. **Inception report:** This shall be prepared and submitted within **ONE week** after the signing of the contract. The Evaluation Team will prepare this after reviewing key technical documents and after discussion with ARC. The inception report shall focus on: the understanding of the Terms of Reference and scope, the relevant methodology to be adopted, the evaluation design and key questions, and, the work-plan for the assignment. The Evaluation Team will be required to present the inception report to the stakeholders in Malawi.
  
- f. **Preliminary findings:** The preliminary findings should be compiled and presented to all the stakeholders involved in the implementation of the ARC financed intervention(s) during the in-country debriefing meeting, **FOUR weeks** after the signing of the contract.
  
- g. **Draft of the process evaluation report:** This shall be prepared and submitted to ARC, **SIX weeks** after the signing of the contract following the recommended outline (See appendix). The draft report will require feedback in form of comments, questions and inputs from ARC. In addition, the Evaluation Team will be required to present the Draft Report to stakeholders in Malawi and to ARC.
  
- h. **Final process evaluation report:** This shall be prepared following the recommended outline (See appendix) and submitted to ARC on, or before the expiry of the assignment (**SEVEN weeks** after the signing of the contract) after incorporating the comments/inputs on the presented Draft Report. This includes: a master copy of the

final report suitable for reproduction, and four copies, in full colour and bound, as well as soft copies.

### **19. Reporting arrangements**

The Evaluation Team will report directly to the Senior M&E Officer of ARC.

### **20. The proposal**

The proposal should include:

- A detailed elaboration of the understanding of the TOR
- A description of the evaluation plan including details of the proposed methodology, sampling, study design; analysis and reporting and milestones for the evaluation and a timetable of activities.
- Detailed budget
- Past performance summaries (at least three brief descriptions of past or current contracting mechanisms for assignments similar in size, scope and complexity to this tender) and list of references that demonstrate performance in conducting similar evaluations
- CVs conforming to the qualifications listed above for the evaluation team
- Supporting documents including mandatory institutional documents such as incorporation papers



## 8.2 Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation question	Sub-questions	Assessment criteria and indicators	Code	Data source
Q1: Coordination with other programmes during design and implementation	1.1 Degree of coordination is designing and implementing the programme	Degree of involvement of stakeholders in the design of the FIP	1.1.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc) and ARC</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ KII with ARC</li> <li>▪ KII with representative of the humanitarian country teams and clusters involved in the LS-FIRP</li> </ul>
		Existence of, and satisfaction with, the coordination carried out by the stakeholders during implementation to ensure consistency of the ARC pay out with other programme	1.1.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ KII with representative of the humanitarian country teams and clusters involved in the LS-FIRP</li> </ul>
		The modalities of assistance and quantities distributed are harmonized between the various programme of the LS-FIRP	1.1.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> </ul>

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ KII with representative of the humanitarian country teams and clusters involved in the LS-FIRP</li> </ul>
Q2: Achievement of expected results	2.1 Ability of the intervention to achieve the targets set in the FIP	Proportion of staff surveyed who consider that the activities carried out achieved the expected objectives and reason why	2.1.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> </ul>
		Level of achievement of expected results stated in the FIP over the evaluation period	2.1.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> </ul>
		Beneficiary satisfaction with the modality of assistance provided and the distribution process	2.1.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Quantitative survey with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		Feedback from beneficiaries on the number and quantity of items received // cash transfer value	2.1.4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Quantitative survey with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		Factors limiting or helping to achieve the objectives of the intervention	2.1.5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> </ul>

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Quantitative survey with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		Effects on beneficiaries of the delivery (or non-delivery) within the timeframe of the intervention	3.1.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Quantitative survey with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
	2.2 Ability of the intervention to target food-insecure people	Suitability of the targeting strategy with the objective of targeting populations most affected by drought and food insecure during the lean season	2.2.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Quantitative survey with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		Measures put in place to deal with inclusion and exclusion errors at the time of targeting	2.2.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.)</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Quantitative survey with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		Positive or negative unexpected effects produced by the chosen targeting methodology	2.2.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> </ul>

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.)</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Quantitative survey with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		Project beneficiaries' awareness of and access to the complaints management mechanism	2.2.4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Quantitative survey with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
	Gender mainstreaming measures implemented as part of the ARC pay out	Measures put in place for the targeting and extent to which they were effective.	2.3.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.)</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		Measures put in place for the delivery and the extent to which they were affected	2.3.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.)</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
<b>Q3: Efficiency of response</b>	3.1 Compliance of FIP implementation with ARC standard operating procedures and with implementation periods	Gap between planned completion date and completion of the activity/task for SOP 1 to 18 in the FIP	3.1.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (WFP, Ministry of Agriculture) and ARC</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> </ul>

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries</li> <li>▪ Quantitative survey with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		Gap between the activity/tasks in the SOP and the actual delivery for SOP 1 to 18 in the FIP	3.1.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (WFP, Ministry of Agriculture) and ARC</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> <li>▪ FGD with beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		Internal or external factors that had an impact on the timely delivery of the project	3.1.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (WFP, Ministry of Agriculture) and ARC</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> </ul>
	3.2 The extent to which the intervention made efficient use of the resources available to achieve its objectives	Cost-to Transfer Ratio	3.2.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> </ul>
		Internal or external factors that had an impact on the timely delivery of the project	3.2.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> <li>▪ KII with district councils and other local government bodies</li> </ul>
		Measures to reduce costs and time taken	3.2.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> </ul>
	3.3 Efficiency of the monitoring and evaluation system to steer	Availability of information through monthly or quarterly implementation reports	3.3.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> </ul>

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

	the implementation of the programme at national level			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> </ul>
		Systematic disaggregation of intervention data	3.3.2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> </ul>
		Monitoring and evaluation framework and relevance of performance indicators	3.3.3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> </ul>
		Implementation of recommendations from previous evaluations	3.3.4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Desk review</li> <li>▪ KII with DODMA</li> <li>▪ KII with other implementers (NDPRC, WFP, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.) and ARC</li> </ul>

### 8.3 Detailed Methodology

107. The methodology for this process evaluation relied on a **mixed method approach**, i.e. the combined use of qualitative and quantitative methods. It combined a desk review of existing documents, in-depth interviews with the project's key informants at the local and national level, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, and a survey with a randomly selected representative sample of beneficiaries.

#### Inception phase & desk review

108. The consultancy started with a kick-off call with representatives from ARC, DoDMA and MOA on 12 October 2023. The purpose of the call was to refine the evaluation team's (ET) understanding of the TORs, clarify the scope of the evaluation and discuss the evaluation's timeline and methodology.

109. The ET submitted a first draft inception report on 3 November, which includes detailed objectives and scope; an evaluation matrix with evaluation questions, indicators and data sources; a detailed methodology and timeline; and data collection tools.

110. The inception report was based on a desk review of internal and external documents to the project. The desk review continued in country, collecting key documents after interviews with project staff. A total of 32 documents were reviewed and used to produce this evaluation report.

#### Primary data collection

111. The ET collected primary data in Lilongwe and all three regions (Northern, Centre and Southern) where the ARC payout took place. To ensure the diversity of locations, the team visited districts per region. Balancing the need for representation, and thus to collect data in as many districts as possible, with the resources available for this process evaluation, **the evaluation team visited 8 of the 18 districts supported by ARC funding**, as detailed in the table below.

Table 16: Districts visited

Region	District selected	Type of assistance
Southern	Chikwawa	In-kind assistance
Centre	Dedza	Cash Transfer
Centre	Dowa	Cash Transfer
Northern	Karonga	Cash Transfer
Centre	Mchinji	Cash Transfer
Southern	Mwanza	Cash Transfer
Northern	Nkhatabay	Cash Transfer
Southern	Nsanje	In-kind assistance

112. For districts receiving cash transfers, the selection was done randomly, after excluding four districts that were either covered by a recent impact evaluation conducted by the firm OPM or whose access was not feasible within the timeframe of the data collection. For the two districts

receiving in-kind assistance, the ET sampled the only two districts in the Southern Region that theoretically received in-kind assistance based on the FIP.

113. For the **survey**,<sup>129</sup> the sample size was initially determined by a representative sample size consideration and budgetary considerations. The sample size calculation<sup>130</sup> indicates that, for a confidence interval of **95 percent, a margin of error of 6 (5.96) percent** and a total population size of 172,616 recipients, 270 surveys are required. **Factoring in a 10 percent margin of error for the survey, in case respondents needed to be removed due to incomplete forms or quality issues, the ET aimed for at least 299 surveys.** The ET stratified the sample based on the breakdown between cash and in-kind recipients,<sup>131</sup> and on the gender of responders.<sup>132</sup> Nine enumerators were hired to support primary data collection in Malawi. They underwent a two-day training session, including a pilot test. At a rate of around five to six households to be surveyed per day and per enumerator, the data collection target was reached in 11 days (including four days of travel for enumerators). The survey lasted 30 minutes and was administered via mobile data collection.

114. The ET visited three to six villages per district, sampled randomly. In each village, the ET conducted at least ten surveys, aiming to ensure an equal breakdown between men and women respondents. In the end, the ET overachieved their objective and were able to complete 399 surveys, **thus reaching 5 per cent margin of error**, after cleaning, interviewing 242 and 157 men and women. It worth noting that survey respondents were sampled randomly based on the beneficiary lists provided by the district authorities.

**Table 17: Sample size**

Region	District	Size (n)	Type of assistance
Southern	Chikwawa	62	In-kind assistance
Centre	Dedza	43	Cash Transfer
Centre	Dowa	41	Cash Transfer
Northern	Karonga	42	Cash Transfer
Centre	Mchinji	43	Cash Transfer
Southern	Mwanza	60	Cash Transfer
Northern	Nkhatabay	44	Cash Transfer

<sup>129</sup> The ARC's audit methodology recommends carrying out "spot checks" on a statistically representative sample of direct beneficiaries to evaluate targeting and inclusion in the programme, and to assess recipients' perception of results.

<sup>130</sup>

$$n \geq \frac{\alpha * N}{N + \alpha - 1} \text{ avec } \alpha = \left(\frac{Z}{\epsilon}\right)^2 * p * (1 - p) \text{ (E.1)}$$

n: Sample size

N: Size of target population

ε : Margin of error

p: Proportion of the population with the characteristics studied.

Z: z score with a 90% confidence interval

<sup>131</sup> As cash recipients represented 61% of the caseload based on the FIP, the ET sought to interview 165 households (182 with the 10% margin of error) that received a cash transfer and 106 households (117 with the 10% margin of error) that received in-kind support.

<sup>132</sup> The sample will be broken down based on the gender of the recipients. In other words, the ET will aim to interview 150 men and women as part of the quantitative data collection.



Southern	Nsanje	98	Mixed modality (Cash Transfer & In-kind assistance)
----------	--------	----	---

115. The ET conducted a total of 22 FGDs involving both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Among the beneficiaries, the ET organized and facilitated 13 FGDs across seven districts. In order to foster open expression, female and male beneficiaries were generally separated during these discussions. Consequently, the ET led five FGDs exclusively with men and five with women. Additionally, three FGDs were conducted with a mixed group of participants when logistical constraints prevented separate discussions.
116. The ET conducted nine FGDs with non-beneficiaries. Non-beneficiaries comprise households that were affected by the drought and were not included in the LR-FIRP, as well as representatives of VCPCs, who organized and oversaw the community-based targeting. The ET conducted four FGDs (one with women, two with men and one mixed) with households that were not eligible, and five FGDs with members of VCPCs, in six different districts.
117. All FGDs took place in the same locations as the quantitative data collection to strengthen and validate findings from survey participants against insights gathered from focused discussions and key informants in the same sampled areas. Beneficiary FGD participants were randomly selected from the lists provided by district authorities. In contrast, participants in FGDs with non-beneficiaries and VCPCs were purposefully sampled with the assistance of community leaders.
118. Furthermore, the evaluation team conducted 21 semi-structured interviews with local and international stakeholders involved in the design and implementation of the payout. The interviews took place either face-to-face or remotely. The breakdown of interviews is as follows:
- Nine interviews with ARC implementers (DoDMA, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, etc.);
  - Three with presentatives from ARC;
  - Six with district councils and other local government bodies;
  - Three KIIs with representatives of the humanitarian country teams and clusters involved in the LS-FIRP.

### Data analysis

119. The analysis of each of the evaluation questions was based on a synthesis of data from different sources. The triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data at all stages (e.g. document review versus institutional interviews in Malawi; interviews at the central level versus interviews with regional/departmental managers; interviews with regional/departmental managers versus surveys of beneficiaries; etc.) ensures the reliability of the findings.
120. The ET recorded disaggregated qualitative data and coded them against evaluation and sub-evaluation questions to analyse emerging trends. The analysis was done iteratively in order to

adjust the data collection tools and explore certain trends in greater depth. Quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistics in Excel.

121. After submitting the first draft, the ET organized a presentation to discuss the draft report with the main stakeholders in Malawi.
122. Upon submitting the evaluation report and receiving comments, the evaluation team will be considered in the final version of the report, together with a matrix for responding to comments. The final report will be validated by the ARC's Senior M&E Officer.

#### 8.4 Data Collection tools

##### Note to presenter

*When conducting group discussions, take into account age, gender and diversity, as well as the time you will be asking participants to devote to the discussion. The questionnaire is designed for an hour and a half. Be well prepared, know your scenario/guide well and try to keep your group to a reasonable size (between 5 and 8 people). Constantly encourage each participant to contribute to the discussion; more dominant personalities may not easily give introverts the opportunity to contribute. Make sure you follow Covid-19's preventive measures throughout the study. A few tips to share with participants:*

- *Everyone has the right to express their opinion - it doesn't have to be unanimous. Every opinion is important and valuable to us - there are no right or wrong statements, we just want them to be honest,*
- *We don't interrupt each other - only one person speaks at a time.*
- *We stick to the themes of the meeting - the moderator can bring the discussion back on track if there are any digressions.*

*This is just an example; each moderator can adapt this advice to his or her preferences and the knowledge of the participants.*

The ARC would like to carry out **an evaluation of the ARC payment process for the 2021-22 season in Malawi**. This is a participatory learning exercise that should be useful to you. The purpose of this interim evaluation, carried out by Key Aid Consulting, is two fold:

- It aims to **determine whether the emergency plan, drawn up by the Government of Malawi and ARC, has been implemented as planned in terms of process and management**. Overall, this evaluation will provide an overview of the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation, the achievement of results, the quality of implementation and the satisfaction of beneficiaries.
- It will also seek to **draw lessons and make recommendations to inform the future design and implementation** of Cash payments in Malawi and other ARC-supported countries.

*Key Aid Consulting complies with the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Directive, which came into force on 25 May 2018. The information you provide will remain anonymous and the final report will not name you. All your personal data will be automatically deleted after one year. Please*

also note that you have the right to access, rectify and delete any data you have provided to us following this interview by emailing [info@keyaidconsulting.com](mailto:info@keyaidconsulting.com)

<b>Date :</b>			
<b>Location:</b>			
<b>Total number of participants</b>	<b>Number of men</b>	<b>Number of women</b>	<b>Number of disabled people</b>

## Beneficiaries

Code	Questions	Answers
4.1	<p>1. Do you know what African Risk Capacity is?</p> <p><i>[To the Moderator]: If not, please try to briefly explain ARC and its objectives: ARC is an agency that helps the government of Malawi support Malawian populations affected by natural disasters, such as drought. In 2022, thanks to ARC funding, the government organised cash and food distribution in your locality.</i></p>	
4.1	<p>2. Do you remember receiving this assistance?</p> <p><i>[To the Moderator]: Try to confirm with the beneficiaries that you are indeed referring to this assistance and not to another distribution carried out by the GOM. You can do this by asking the following question.</i></p>	
3.1.2	<p>3. What did you receive as part of the Cash or Food Assistance intervention? Can you specify when the distribution took place? Was the assistance identical for all beneficiaries?</p>	
3.1.2	<p>4. Can you explain if you were part of the selection process? Were there any specific targeting criteria that you were aware of?</p>	
2.2.1	<p>5. Would you say that the ARC/GOM intervention effectively targeted the households that needed it most, i.e. those who suffered most from the drought? Why do you say that?</p>	
2.2.2	<p>6. Are you aware of any measures that have been put in place to ensure that targeting is aimed at beneficiaries who were most affected by the drought in 2022? Could you tell us more about this?</p>	

Code	Questions	Answers
2.2.3	7. Have you noticed any unintended consequences, either positive or negative, resulting from the way in which beneficiaries have been targeted for intervention?	
2.2.4	8. Did you have access to a complaint management mechanism set up by the ARC/GOM? If so, did you use it? If not, what were the reasons for not using it?	
2.1.4	9. Coming back to the assistance distributed, are you satisfied with the quantity and quality of the food or cash you received? Can you explain your reasoning in detail? Are there any specific elements of the assistance that you find particularly useful or useless?	
2.1.3	10. Do you think that the type of assistance used (general food distribution) or cash distribution was appropriate? Why or why not? Would another method (vouchers, cash, other food baskets etc.) have been more appropriate? Why or why not?	
2.1.5	11. Did you observe any impact on the prices of other foodstuffs or on the availability of certain foodstuffs in the weeks following the distribution? Can you explain what happened? Were there any other positive or negative factors that influenced the effectiveness of the ARC/GOM's intervention regarding your food security?	
2.1.2	12. In the event of drought, what strategies do you put in place to meet your needs in a period of low harvest? Do you feel that the intervention of the ARC/GOV has helped you to avoid some of these strategies? Could you give some examples?	
2.1.2	13. What did you think of the distribution process (place, date, time)? Was it adapted to your situation? [To the moderator]: Ask the question without giving any details, then ask for details on the reasons why households were satisfied or dissatisfied with the distribution process.	
3.1.1	14. When do you think is the best time to distribute drought relief? [To the moderator]: It is not necessary to record a month. Try to discuss with the beneficiaries the lean period or other temporal indicators. 15. Was the ARC/GOV distribution carried out at that time?	
2.1.6	16. How were you affected by the timely delivery (or lack thereof) of the ARC/GOM intervention?	

Code	Questions	Answers
2.3.1	17. Do you remember any specific actions implemented by ARC/GOM to promote gender equality during the intervention? What were these actions? What did you think of them?	
4.2	18. Are there any other aspects of the ARC/GOM intervention that you would like to share or discuss that were not covered in our previous questions?	

### Non-beneficiaries/Community Leaders/VDC

Code	Questions	Answers
4.1	1. Do you know what African Risk Capacity is? <i>[To the Moderator]: If not, please try to briefly explain ARC and its objectives: ARC is an agency that helps the Government of Malawi (GOM) to support Malawian populations affected by natural disasters, such as drought. In 2022, thanks to ARC funding, the GOM organised a food distribution in your locality.</i>	
4.1	2. Do you remember any households in your area benefiting from this assistance? <i>[To the Moderator]: Try to confirm with beneficiaries that you are indeed referring to this assistance and not another distribution carried out by the GOM.</i>	
3.1.2	3. Can you explain the selection process you were part of? Were there any specific targeting criteria that you were aware of?	
2.2.1	4. Would you say that the ARC/GOM intervention effectively targeted the households that needed it most, i.e. those who suffered most from the drought? Why do you say that?	
2.2.2	5. Are you aware of any measures that have been put in place to ensure that targeting is aimed at beneficiaries who were most affected by the drought in 2022? Could you tell us more about this?	
2.2.3	6. Have you noticed any unintended consequences, either positive or negative, resulting from the way in which beneficiaries have been targeted for intervention?	
2.2.4	7. Did you have access to a complaint management mechanism set up by the ARC/GOM? If so, did you use it? If not, what were the reasons for not using it?	
2.1.5	8. Did you observe any impact on the prices of other foodstuffs or on the availability of certain foodstuffs in the weeks following the distribution? Can you explain what happened? Were there any other positive or	

Code	Questions	Answers
	negative factors that influenced the effectiveness of the ARC/GOM's intervention regarding your food security?	
2.3.1	9. Do you remember any specific actions implemented by ARC/GOM to promote gender equality during the intervention? What were these actions? What did you think of them?	
4.2	10. Are there any other aspects of the ARC /GOM intervention that you would like to share or discuss that were not covered in our previous questions?	

## Appendix 6: Data collection tool - Quantitative

Hello, my name is...

I work for Key Aid a consultancy that collects data for an evaluation. This **independent** evaluation was **commissioned by the African Risk Capacity, a donor who contributed the 2022 Drought response plan implemented by the Government of Malawi.**

This evaluation is being carried out by an **independent evaluation team managed by Key Aid Consulting.** According to our data, you have received **food aid/cash transfers** as part of this response plan. We would like to ask you a few questions. The information you provide today will help us to :

- Hear from you what has worked well and what could be improved.
- To hear your concrete recommendations.
- Develop better answers in the future thanks to your feedback.

You will need between 20 and 30 minutes to complete this short survey. **Thank you in advance for your time.** No names will be recorded with the survey responses and no names will be published from the survey. We will only publish aggregated data and there won't be any way to retrace our findings to what you said.

**Research staff will not share your personal information with anyone outside the study, and they will do their best to protect your information.** Any information you may give if it contains information that could enable someone to identify you with any degree of certainty, will be transformed and made unreadable as far as possible to any unauthorised person.

After one year, all personal information such as name, telephone number, district name, etc. will be deleted.

You can speak to Lutamy Mwamlima 0993713188 if you have any questions, concerns, complaints or if you feel you have been injured during the study.

Do you have any other questions?

If I've answered all your questions, do you agree to take part in this study? Yes/No



2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
	Single choice	All	Do you agree to take part in this study?	Yes No (end of questionnaire)
	Single choice	All	1. Are you [NAME OF BENEFICIARY TO BE INVESTIGATED]?	Yes No (end of questionnaire) No, but I can represent the household in place of the person indicated
			<i>[To the enumerator] : If available can you verify the head of household's national identification number: or his telephone number:</i>	
	Unique choice	All	2. <i>[To the enumerator] Please observe the respondent and tick the option yourself without asking the respondent.</i>	A man A woman
	Unique choice	All	3. What is your age range	Under 18s (end of questionnaire) 18-30 years old Aged 31-45 46-60 years old Over 60s I don't want to answer I don't know
	Single choice	All	4. Do you know what <i>African Risk Capacity</i> is?	Yes, I know No, I don't know
	NOTE	No" answers to the previous question	Alternatively, ARC is an agency that helps the Department of Disaster Management Affairs of Malawi and the District Councils to support household affected by natural disasters, such as drought. In 2022, thanks	



2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
			to ARC funding, the DODMA organised a food /cash distribution in your region.	
	Single choice	All	5. Has your household, received assistance with the DODMA/ARC intervention in 2022?	Yes No (end of questionnaire)
	MONTH - YEAR	All	6. When did you, and your household, receive the assistance?	August 2022 September 2022 October 2022 November 2022 December 2022 January 2023 February 2023 March 2023 April 2023 May 2023 June 2023 Other, please specify I don't know
2.1.2	Single choice	All	7. What did you, and your household, receive?	In-Kind Assistance – 50KG Maize per month Cash Transfers – MK 25,000 per month Other (please specify) I don't know
2.1.2	Single choice		8. For how many months did you, and your household, receive the support	1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
				Other, please specify I don't know
2.1.2	Multiple choice	All	9. Have you, and your household, received any other assistance from the GOM in the last three years?	Yes, please specify No, I've not received Other, please specify I don't know
2.1.2	MONTH - YEAR	All	10. When was the last time you and your household received assistance from this program?	Less than 6 months Between 6 months and 1 year Between 1 and 2 years Between 2 and 3 years I don't know
	NOTE	All	<i>[To the enumerator] Please check with the beneficiary that he/she is indeed a beneficiary. Based on their answers to questions 6, 7 and 8, can you confirm whether they are a beneficiary?</i>	Yes No
	TEXT	No" answers to the previous question	<i>[If not, please explain your reasoning. Do not hesitate to contact your supervisor to be sure.</i>	TEXT (end of questionnaire)
2.2.1	Unique choice	All	11. How were you, and your household, selected for ARC assistance?	Prize draw Based on predefined criteria Selected by the local authority I was part of the Social Cash Transfer Programme Other, please specify I don't know I don't want to answer

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
2.2.1	Unique choice	All	12. Who selected you, and your household, for assistance?	The Chief/Village heads The VDC or ADC Committee The Civil protection committee (CPCs) Area Protection Committee (APC) Social Welfare Officers or Government officers (DODMA) Social Cash Transfer Programme Officers Other, please specify I don't know
2.2.1	Single choice	All	13. Were you, and your household, satisfied with the way you were informed about the selection?	Very satisfied Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied I don't know I don't want to answer
2.2.1	Multiple choice	All	14. Why or why not ?	Information received on time Information received late Comprehensive information content Incomplete information content Appropriate ways of communicating the selection Unsuitable ways of communicating the selection Other, please specify I don't know I don't want to answer

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
2.2.2	Unique choice	All	15. Do you know people who didn't need the assistance who were included in the assistance/service provided?	Yes, many Yes, few Neutral Not really Not at all I don't know I don't want to answer
2.2.2	Single choice	All	16. Do you know people who need assistance who have been excluded from the assistance/service provided?	Yes, many Yes, few Neutral Not really Not at all I don't know I don't want to answer
2.2.2	TEXT	Yes, many" or "yes, few " answers to the previous two questions	17. Why ?	TEXT
2.1.4	Single choice	In-Kind Assistance to question 8	18. Are you, and your household, satisfied with the quality of the assistance you receive?	Very satisfied Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied I don't know I don't want to answer

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
2.1.4	Multiple choices	Answers "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" to the previous question and In-Kind Assistance to question 8	19. Why ?	Mould Presence of other elements in foodstuffs Damage by insects Discolouration Unsuitable for food consumption Unpleasant taste Other, please specify I don't know I don't want to answer
2.1.4	Multiple choices	Answers "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" to the previous question and Cash Transfers to question 8	20. Why?	The amount per month in insufficient I would prefer to receive the same amount less frequently I would prefer to receive the same amount more frequently Other, please specify I don't know I don't want to answer
2.1.4	Unique choice	In-Kind Assistance to question 8	21. Are you, and your household, satisfied with the quantity of assistance receive?	Very satisfied Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied I don't know I don't want to answer
2.1.4	TEXT	Answers "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" to	22. Why is this?	TEXT

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
		the previous question		
2.1.5	Unique choice	All	23. Did you, and your household, notice any variation in the prices of certain food products in the two weeks following the end of the assistance?	Yes, absolutely Rather yes Neutral Not really Not at all I don't want to answer I don't know
2.1.5	Unique choice	Answers "yes, definitely" or "yes, rather" to the previous question	24. If so, how much do you estimate this variation to be?	Significant increase in market prices (+25%) Increase in market prices (+10-25%) Lower market prices (-10 to -25%) Significant fall in market prices (-25%) I don't want to answer I don't know
2.1.5	Unique choice	All	25. Did you, and your household, notice a reduction in the availability of certain food products in the two weeks following the end of the assistance?	Yes, absolutely Rather yes Neutral Not really Not at all I don't want to answer I don't know
2.1.5	Multiple choice	In-Kind Assistance to question 8	26. How did you, and your household, the kits you received? (Tick all that apply)	I consumed all/part of the assistance I have sold all/part of the audience I shared/gave away all/part of the audience

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
				I have kept/stored all/part of the assistance Other, please specify
2.1.5	Multiple choice	Answer "I shared/gave away all/part of the assistance" to the previous question	27. To whom did you give part of your assistance?	Other households – relatives Other households – non-relatives Community leaders Local authorities Military Unidentified gunmen Staff of a humanitarian organisation Other, please specify I don't want to answer I don't know
2.1.5	Single choice	Answer "I shared/gave away all/part of the assistance" to the previous question	28. Was it voluntary or by force?	Voluntary Compelled I don't want to answer I don't know
3.1.1	Single Choice	All	29. Was your household affected by the poor harvest in 2022?	Yes, absolutely Rather yes Neutral Not really Not at all I don't want to answer I don't know

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
3.1.1	Multiple choice	All	30. What did you and your household do to cover your food needs over the period?	Reducing the frequency or quality of meals Borrowing food or money Buying on credit Selling livestock or other goods Keeping children out of school Migration of one or more members of the household in search of work Other, please specify I don't want to answer I don't know
3.1.1	Multiple choice	All	31. When do you think is the best time to distribute drought relief?	<b>Specify the month</b>  <b>If the respondent does not know the month, please red out the following suggestions:</b> <b>At least one month before the lean season</b> <b>In the month before the lean season</b> <b>During the lean season</b> <b>In the month following the lean season</b> <b>At least one month after the lean season</b> <b>Other, please specify</b> I don't want to answer I don't know
3.1.1	Number	All	32. Has the support come at the right time to help you cope with the	Yes No, it arrived too late No, it arrived too early



2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
			effects of the 2022 crop failure due to drought?	I don't want to answer I don't know
2.1.6	Multiple choice	"Yes" answer to previous question	33. How were you, and your household, affected by the timely delivery (or lack thereof) intervention?	I/ My household was able to increase the quantity or improve the quality of meals I/ My household was able to lend food or money to relatives I/ My household has been able to enrol children in school Other, please specify I don't want to answer I don't know
2.1.6	Multiple choice	Answers "No, it arrived too late" or "No, it arrived too early" to the previous question	34. How were you, and your household, affected by the timely delivery (or lack thereof) intervention?	I/ My household had to reduce the quality or quantity of meals I/ My household has had to borrow food or money from relatives I/ My household has had to buy food on credit I/ My household has had to sell livestock or other assets to cover my food needs I/ My household has had to withdraw my children from school I/ members of my household have had to migrate in search of work Other, please specify I don't want to answer I don't know

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
3.1.1	Text	All	35. How many months do you think the food assistance should last to cope with the poor harvests due to the drought and prevent your household from implementing harmful coping strategies?	Month
2.1.2	Single choice	All	36. Was the distribution process satisfactory for you and your household?	Yes, absolutely Rather yes Neutral Not really satisfied. Not at all satisfied I don't want to answer I don't know
2.1.2	Multiple choice	Answers "not really" or "not at all" to the previous question	37. If not, please explain why?	The distribution site was too far away The distribution site was not shaded. The distribution site was not marked out The waiting time was too long. The distribution site was not secured. The date of the distribution was not convenient Other, please specify I don't want to answer I don't know
2.1.2	Single choice	All	38. How long did you wait at the distribution site to receive your assistance?	Less than 30 minutes Between 30 minutes and one hour Between one and two hours More than two hours I don't want to answer

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
				I don't know
2.1.3	Single choice	All	39. If you had been able to choose the type of assistance, which would you have preferred?	In Kind Assistance Cash in hand Vouchers to be exchanged at partner retailers for food assistance Multi-sector vouchers to be exchanged at partner merchants for the assistance of your choice A mixture of cash and in-kind assistance Other – please specify I don't want to answer I don't know
2.2.4	Unique choice	All	40. If you, or your household, had a suggestion or a problem with the assistance/service, do you think you could pass on the suggestion or make a complaint?	Yes, absolutely Rather yes Neutral Not really Not at all I don't want to answer I don't know
2.2.4	Single choice	All	41. To your knowledge, have suggestions or complaints raised by you, your household, or other members of your community been taken into account or followed up?	Yes, absolutely Rather yes Neutral Not really Not at all I don't want to answer I don't know

2022 Payout Process Evaluation in Malawi

Code	Type of questions	Relevance	Questions	Answers
2.2.4	Multiple choice	Answers "not really" or "not at all" to the previous question	42. If not, could you tell me what the problems were/what happened?	Response times are too long No one wants to hear my complaint The channel is not confidential enough The channel is not accessible (too far away) The channel is not accessible (technology) When I lodged my complaint, I was mocked Other, please specify I don't want to answer I don't know
4.2	TEXT	All	43. Are there any other aspects of the intervention that you would like to share or discuss that were not covered in our previous questions?	TEXT

## 8.5 Document reviewed.

ADE and ECHO. 'Evaluation of the Use of Different Transfer Modalities in ECHO Humanitarian Aid Actions 2011- 2014', 2016.

African Center for Social Research and Economic Development. 'Process Evaluation of the 2016/ 2017 African Risk Capacity (ARC) Payout in Malawi', November 2018.

African Risk Capacity. 'Africa RiskView Drought Model Customisation Report - Malawi', August 2021.

———. 'Africa RiskView END-SEASON REPORT | Malawi (2021/22 SEASON)', June 2022.

———. 'Africa RiskView MID-SEASON REPORT | Malawi (31 January 2022 )', January 2022.

———. 'Stratégie Du Groupe ARC 2020-24', 2020.

ARC. 'APPENDIX 4 - Terms of Reference for the Technical Working Group (TWG) Members', n.d.

FEWSNET. 'Malawi Famine Early Warning Report', September 2022.

———. 'Malawi Key Message Update: Crisis (IPC Phase 3) Expected amid High Food Prices and Insufficient Assistance, September 2023', n.d.

FEWSNET Malawi. *FEWSNET 2022 Report*, 2022.

Government of Malawi. '2022/2023 National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan', October 2022.

———. 'Malawi Approved FIP-ARC Drought Plan', September 2022.

———. 'Malawi Draft FIP-ARC Drought Plan', Unknown.

———. 'National Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Plan', October 2022.

———. 'Operations Plan Malawi (ARC)', June 2023.

———. 'Report On The Implementation Of The Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payout Funding Under The 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme', March 2023.

———. 'Report on the Implementation of the Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payouts Fundig under the 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme', March 2023.

Government of Malawi, Department of Climate Change and Meteological Services. 'Malawi Climate Change and Meteological Data', 2024.

- Government of Malawi, National Statistical Office. '2018 Malawi Population and Housing', n.d.
- IFRC. 'Guide Pour Le Suivi et l'évaluation Des Programmes', 2011.
- Joint Emergency Food Assistance Programme (JEFAP). 'Guidelines for the Provision of Food Assistance during Emergencies in Malawi - OPERATIONAL TOOLS', 2017.
- March 2023. 'Report on the Implementation of the Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Payout Funding under the 2022/2023 Lean Season Food Insecurity Response Programme', March 2023.
- MVAC. 'IPC Acute Food Security Analysis - June 2022-March 2023', August 2022.
- OCHA. 'Anticipatory Action Framework - Malawi Dry Spells', 19 October 2021.
- Pascale Schnitzer and Quentin Stoeffler. 'Targeting for Social Safety Nets - Evidence from Nine Programs in the Sahel', October 2021.
- Talip Kilic et al. 'Gender & Agricultural Productivity in Malawi', 2013.
- The CALP Network. 'Multipurpose Outcome Indicators and Guidance'. Accessed 9 May 2022. <https://www.calpnetwork.org/publication/multipurpose-outcome-indicators-and-guidance/>.
- The Common Wealth. 'Malawi (2022)'. n.d. <https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/malawi#:~:text=Malawi%20is%20a%20%20south%2d%20East,central%20plateaus%20and%20isolated%20mountains.>
- USAID, Malawi. 'HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND RESILIENCE', 2021.
- World Bank. 'Malawi Vulnerability - Climate Change Knowledge Portal', 2021.
- . 'The World Bank in Malawi', October 2023.
- World Food Programme. 'Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket in Malawi- What It Costs for a Household to Survive a Month. Round 64: November 2022', n.d.

